Economic Development and Income Inequality: The Taiwan Case by Chang, Ju-kuang
Portland State University 
PDXScholar 
Dissertations and Theses Dissertations and Theses 
8-2-1995 
Economic Development and Income Inequality: The 
Taiwan Case 
Ju-kuang Chang 
Portland State University 
Follow this and additional works at: https://pdxscholar.library.pdx.edu/open_access_etds 
 Part of the Sociology Commons 
Let us know how access to this document benefits you. 
Recommended Citation 
Chang, Ju-kuang, "Economic Development and Income Inequality: The Taiwan Case" (1995). Dissertations 
and Theses. Paper 4875. 
https://doi.org/10.15760/etd.6751 
This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access. It has been accepted for inclusion in Dissertations and 
Theses by an authorized administrator of PDXScholar. Please contact us if we can make this document more 
accessible: pdxscholar@pdx.edu. 
THESIS APPROVAL 
The abstract and thesis of Ju-kuang Chang for the Master of Arts in Sociology were 
presented August 2, 1995, and accepted by the thesis committee and the department. 
COMMITTEE APPROVALS: 
DEPARTMENTAL APPROVAL: 
Representative of the Office of Graduate Studies 
Robert W. Shotola, Chair 
Department of Sociology 
************************************************************************ 
ACCEPTED FOR PORTLAND ST ATE UNIVERSITY BY THE LIBRARY 
<..:=. - AJ t;7?. 
on o" /GYUP'4n.--d-&;-tu ,/~t;?s 
ABSTRACT 
An abstract of the thesis of Ju-kuang Chang for the Master of Arts in Sociology 
presented August 2, 1995. 
Title: Economic Development and Income Inequality: The Taiwan Case 
This thesis examines income inequality in Taiwan from three perspectives: 
economic development, political democracy, and world-system/dependence. Education, 
population growth, population structure, unemployment, savings, and export growth 
are treated as variables. Below are the important conclusions. 
Economic development has an effect on income inequality. The level of 
development is crucial. In the 1950s and 1960s, the relationship was significant, but in 
the next two decades economic development did not further decrease income inequality. 
Sector dualism was not a good predictor. 
Democratization did not have an obvious relation with income inequality. But 
the stable political environment and the endeavors of government to keep the society 
stable were crucial to economic development and improvement in income inequality. 
Foreign capital and export dependence did not retard economic development and 
worsen income inequality. But the influence of foreign capital did not contradict the 
world-system/dependence argument. 
Expansion of education had a negative relation with income inequality. The 
most important thing was the expansion of primary school education and junior high 
school education. 
The predicted relation between population growth and population structure and 
income inequality was not totally supported. 
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Export expansion and savings expansion had an important influence on economic 
development and, like the relation between the economic development and income 
inequality, the relation between the expansion of exports and savings and income 
inequality was stronger in the 1960s than in the 1950s. 
Unemployment had almost the same change pattern as income inequality. This 
implies that employment had a negative relation with income inequality and, after 1970, 
the low unemployment helped keep inequality at a low level in the 1970s and 1980s. 
In the late 1980s and early 1990s income inequality increased slightly as radical 
changes in economic structure, political environment, and other social factors 
transformed Taiwan. Other developed countries also show an increase in income 
inequality associated with similar changes. Thus income inequality in Taiwan is 
predicted to increase further. 
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CHAPTER I 
RELEVANT STUDIES AND RESEARCH PURPOSE 
Despite years of speculation and research, scholars still disagree on the causes of 
variation in income inequality in a society. In this study three theoretical perspectives 
(economic, political-democratic, and world-system) used to explain income inequality and 
the influence of some other social factors on income inequality are examined. 
Economic Development Perspective 
Economists argue that a nation's income inequality stems from the dynamics of 
distribution. In the economic model, inequality increases in the early stages of economic 
growth, reaches a peak, and then declines (Kuznets, 1963). During the first stage of 
economic growth, wealthier classes accumulate savings faster than poorer classes and 
display a greater marginal propensity to save, and urbanization produces spatial inequality. 
In the second stage, income inequality declines because (1) of the expanding demand for 
industrial labor force; (2) the wealthier classes tend toward fiscal conservatism and invest 
less in new high-risk invesnnents while the less wealthy, often with more liquid capital, 
invest in new and expanding "boom" industries with greater rewards; and (3) given that 
the marginal utility of income is the inverse of income level, the poor have a greater 
incentive to work, save, and invest (Simpson, 1990; Isaacs, 1981; Kuznets, 1963, 1976; 
Paukert t, 1973). The size of the agricultural sector of the economy may have a direct 
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impact on income inequality. The more agrarian the nation, the greater the gulf between 
rural and urban incomes (Bollen and Jackman, 1985). 
Cutright (1967), using data for 44 non-communist nations and eight communist 
states, found that the transition of the labor force from the agricultural sector to the 
nonagricultural sector has an effect on income inequality. Kuznets (1955) argued that (1) 
high inequality was associated with low income per capita, (2) savings had an effect on 
income inequality, and (3) sector shift had an effect on inequality. Bollen and Jackman 
(1985), using data for 60 countries, found that economic development had a significant, 
negative effect on income inequality. Lindert and Williamson ( 1985) presented 
comparable longitudinal data over several decades for a set of European countries that 
showed the strikingly parallel decline of income inequality in these countries over the 
course of their continued development. Simpson (1990), using data for 62 countries, 
found that economic development did not have an effect on income inequality. Nielsen 
(1994), using data for 56 countries, found the labor force shift from agriculture to 
nonagriculture and the shift in economic activity from agriculture to industry had an 
negative effect on income inequality. 
Political Democracy Perspective 
Lenski (1966) stressed the impact of the nation's political system on income 
inequality. He argued that while a society's technological base influenced economic 
inequality through its impact on the political system and the balance of power within a 
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society, the economic system had no direct effect on income inequality. Historically, 
property inequality was greatest in advanced agrarian societies and the appearance of 
mature industrial societies had marked the first significant reversal in the age-old 
evolutionary trend toward ever increasing inequality. But it is neither the technology nor 
the wealth of industrial nations that reduces inequality. In industrial societies a high 
portion of the adults vote and may organize politically to advance their interests or beliefs, 
even when these are in opposition to the interests or beliefs of those in power. When 
advanced industrial societies elevate the middle class and working class politically and 
educationally, the many can combine against the few. Even though individually the many 
are weaker, in combination, they may be as strong or stronger. With further expansion of 
the political base, government is no longer for the benefit of the few and radical changes in 
the distribution of services and goods are possible. 
Most studies of this question have examined the fit of a linear relationship between 
political democracy and income inequality and have found contradictory results. Muller 
(1988), using data for 55 countries, found that democratization reduced income inequality 
in a society. Cutright (1967), using data for 52 countries (forty-four non-communist 
nations and eight communist states), found a negative relationship between 
democratization and inequality. Simpson (1990) using two sets of data, sixty-two nations 
of Muller's data set and sixty-one nations of Hoover's data set, found that political 
democracy had a significant direct impact on income inequality. Nielsen (1994), using 
data of fifty-six countries, found that political democracy had a negative effect on income 
inequality. Some other studies report a negative relationship between democratization and 
inequality (Hewitt, 1977; Muller, 1985; Rubinson and Quinlan, 1977; Stack, 1979). 
Bollen and Jackman (1985), using data of sixty countries, found no evidence of direct 
effects of political democracy on income inequality. Some other studies also found no 




World-system and dependence theorists link a nation's level of income inequality to 
its position in the world economic order (Bornschier, 1983; Chase-Dunn, 1975; Evans and 
Timberlake, 1980; Nolan, 1983; Snyder and Kick, 1979; Wallerstein, 1974, 1979). 
According to this view, nation states are embedded in a wider system of economic 
relationships consisting of the core, the periphery, and (in an intermediate position) the 
semi-periphery. Relationships between these three blocks of countries are asymmetrical 
and fundamentally exploitative, with the core benefiting at the expense of the other two 
blocks. Paralleling this is the emergence of new patterns of intranational stratification that 
increase distributional inequality in noncore countries. A nation on the economic 
periphery, being dependent on exports of commodities and with a high level of penetration 
of foreign capital by multinational corporations (MNCs), is divided into traditional and 
modern economic sectors. A small, relatively wealthy "modern" sector coexists with and 
exploits a large, poor, "traditional" sector. Foreign MNCs and a small group of 
indigenous elites exploit the power distribution within the nation and retard the 
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development of its infrastructure, except where it supports the MNC's interests. This, in 
turn, exacerbates social inequality within noncore countries. This dependency-inequality 
linkage has received a good deal of study. Most effort has centered on the dependency 
variant of the argument, employing continuous measures of trade dependence, the 
penetration of foreign capital, and the like. Some have claimed that the dependency-
inequality relationship is relatively robust (Evans and Timberlake, 1980). Nolan (1983) 
found evidence for the world-system model after controlling for energy consumption. 
However, neither Weeds and Kummer (1985) nor Bollen and Jackman (1985) found a 
significant world-system effect in their analyses. 
Other Relevant Studies 
Sociologists stress the role of social factors, for example, education and population 
composition, that affect income inequality. Education may affect income inequality 
because it prepares students for the role of citizen and provides job skill. It also allocates 
individuals to social ranks, the elite or nonelite, and students tend to adopt the social 
qualities appropriate to the position their schools assign to them. Providing education to a 
select few and leaving the remainder of society unschooled divides a society into an elite 
that can function successfully in a modem society and those who are locked in a 
traditional mode. Early educational expansion thus increases income inequality, but 
further expansion of the educational system dilutes the value of education for the elite. 
John Stuart Mill (1848) predicted that the diffusion of education would lead to a decrease 
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in inequality. Nielsen (1994) and Simpson (1990) found that the spread of education had 
a negative effect on income inequality. On the other hand, demographic structure may 
amplify income inequality (Bollen and Jackman, 1985). In nations with high rates of 
population growth, different income groups grow at different rates. The poorest sectors 
have higher birth rates and grow quickly, resulting in a high proportion of the young 
concentrated in the lowest income groups (Ahluwalia, 197 6). That is, high population 
growth generates inequality by expanding the proportion of the population in low-income 
groups. The problem is compounded by the fact that high growth typically involves high 
levels of fertility and decreases in mortality, resulting in a very young population age 
structure, especially among low-income groups. Younger populations located 
disproportionately within lower-income groups exacerbate inequality by lowering per 
capita productivity. The longer-term results may be even more severe, since the larger 
family size associated with younger populations further reduces the already small 
intergenerational transfer of income (Boulier, 1977). Thus, the relevance of population 
growth rates for inequality seems to depend primarily on the way population growth 
influencing the age structure of the population (Hargens and Felmlee, 1984). Bollen and 
Jackman (1985) found that the percentage of population under age 15 had a positive 
relation with income inequality. Nielsen (1994) found the demographic transition and 
natural rate of population increase had a positive effect on income inequality. Simpson 




Most of the analyses of income inequality in a society have followed a 
conventional strategy of relying on a cross section of a single calendar year, but such a 
cross section neglects longitudinal information. It assumes that the factors would affect 
inequality in 1990 in the same way as 1950. Therefore, it makes sense to pool, in the 
same data set, all available observations on income inequality (and corresponding 
independent variables), allowing multiple observations (in different years) for the same 
country (Nielsen, 1994 ). The necessity of the study of longitudinal data is also advocated 
by Gagliani (1987). Such a design allows the comparison of cross-sectional and 
longitudinal patterns of relationships (Firebaugh, 1980). 
The research here has followed that advice. The data used in this study is for 
Taiwan from 1950 to 1990. The research purpose is to test the three perspectives used to 
explain income inequality in a society. The study also examines the factors thought by 
sociologists to affect income inequality, including education and demographic factors. In 
addition, the study examines three factors that are put forward as factors that reduce 
income inequality in Taiwan (Myers, 1990; Scitovsky, 1990). The three factors are 
employment, export-led growth, and savings. Myers (1990) cited a number of factors that 
contributed to reducing income inequality in Taiwan. The high rate of employment 
between 1965 and 1981 increased labor's share of income and narrowed the gap between 
the wages of skilled and unskilled labor. As incomes rise, both consumption and savings 
increase. These stimulate further economic growth and at the same time enhance 
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productivity and create job opportunities. Scitovsky (1990) argued that the high labor 
intensity of Taiwan's rapidly expanding exports accounted for the very low and 
continuously declining unemployment rates (a unique accomplishment among developing 
counties). It increases the earnings of labor and so improves the distribution of income. 
In Taiwan the statistics showed a shift of income from capital to labor among nonfarm 
households and a consequent reduction of inequalities in the overall distribution of income 
between 1964 and 1987. Taiwan's high interest rate policy is a standard remedy for 
inflation, but, totally unexpected, is another effect that follows the policy: the acceleration 
of capital accumulation and growth. Savings deposits accumulate very fast following the 
substantial raising of the interest paid on deposits. They may have increased people's 
proportion of income, and make more profitable the use of labor-intensive methods of 
production. Equitable income distribution favors the expansion of effective demand and 
tends to concentrate it on domestically produced goods. The increase in domestic demand 
for domestic goods in turn calls for domestic investment, which not only creates additional 
productive capacity and employment opportunities but also enhances the standard of 
living. In sum, monetary policy influences savings and the savings helps capital 
accumulation and at the same time increases employment and income. Export growth 
leads to economic development and enhances productivity. It also increases employment, 
income, and the standard of living. 
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Diagrammatically, a Lorenz Curve is derived by plotting the cumulative percentage of the 
households (ranked from the poorest up to the wealthiest), shown on the horizontal axis, 
against the cumulative percentage share of the total income they receive, shown on the 
vertical axis. The diagonal line (where Gini coefficient equals zero) represents the perfect 
equality of income distribution. 
Source: Kuo, Shirley W. Y. et al.(1981), The Taiwan Success Story. (p. 86) Boulder, 
Co. Westview Press. 
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CHAPTER II 
VARIABLES, HYPOTHESES, AND DATA 
Variables and Definition 
The study uses the income shared by the highest quintile and the Gini coefficient to 
measure income inequality, the dependent variable. These two are the variables most 
frequently used to measure inequality of the income distribution (Muller, 1988; Nielsen, 
1994; Simpson, 1990). The larger the percentage of income that goes to the highest 
quintile, the greater the income inequality in a society. The Gini coefficient is also used as 
an indicator of income equality. The greater the coefficient, the less even the income 
distribution. As is shown in Figure 2.1 the Gini coefficient is the ratio of the area enclosed 
by the diagonal line and the Lorenz Curve to the area of the triangle, namely the shaded 
area ABC to the area of triangle ABD. Kolm ( 1976) argued that given any reasonable 
looking index of inequality it was always possible to find another one providing the 
opposite answer to the question that is normally addressed. Braun ( 1991) argued that the 
Gini ratio did have a few weaknesses as a measure of income inequality. 
This seemed inevitable with any figure that tried to show a 
complex process with one number. The Dow-Jones Industrial Average, 
although widely used and almost religiously followed, is only a composite 
of a few selected stocks among the many traded on the New York Stock 
Exchange. At times it has also been criticized for not being representative 
of activity on the exchange because of its makeup. Yet it continues to 
provide a useful function for analysts. So too, does the Gini ratio. This 
technique is the oldest and most reliable of income inequality 
measurements. It has now been in use for three quarters of a century. Its 
utility also depends greatly on how we wish to use the Gini ratio. In an 
analysis comparing Gini with seven different income inequality 
measurements, the choice of measure did not really matter in looking 
at the factors that we wish to pursue. Other studies show that the Gini 
ratio is an ideal way to measure income change within the middle class 
(Braun, 1991 :79). 
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Gagliani ( 1987) also supported the argument that the Gini coefficient is a preferable index 
of income inequality. In sum, the Gini coefficient is a good indicator of income inequality 
and is widely used. 
In cross-national study, Hoover (1989) pointed to three problems in measurement 
of income inequality. The first is the inconsistency in calculating the Gini coefficient. For 
example, some countries use data of decile income distribution to calculate the Gini 
coefficients and some use data of quintile income distribution to calculate the Gini 
coefficients. The inconsistency will introduce unnecessary error into one's analysis. 
Secondly, the measurement of income is inconsistent in pre-tax income or post-tax 
income, and is inconsistent in individual's income and household's income. That is, some 
countries use data of pre-tax income to measure the inequality in income distribution, and 
some use data of post-tax income. Generally speaking, the post-tax income distribution is 
more equal than pre-tax income distribution. The other inconsistency is that some 
countries use individual income to measure the inequality in income distribution, and some 
countries use household income. The third problem is that researchers generally do not 
"time match II their independent variables to the inequality data. For example, the variables 
of GNP per capita, political democracy index, and foreign investment are measured in 
1970 and the Gini coefficient is measured in 197 5. The study here will try to avoid these 
problems or to specify clearly each indicator. 
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Independent variables measure economic development, political democracy, and 
world-system/dependence. This study uses the energy consumption per capita (Nielsen, 
1994; Muller, 1988; Bollen, 1983, 1979; Simpson, 1990) and GNP per capita to measure 
economic development (Nielsen, 1994; Bollen and Jackman, 1985). To measure the labor 
force shift from the agricultural sector to the modem sectors of economy (the 
heterogeneous development that might generate income inequality) the percent labor force 
in agriculture (Nielsen, 1994) is used in this study. Following Lecaillon et al. (1984) and 
Nielsen (1994), this study uses the expression, "sector dualism," to denote the process by 
which shift between sectors generates income inequality and the amount of inequality 
between the traditional and modern sectors of a developing economy. The sector dualism 
is calculated empirically (within the simplified two-sector framework) using widely 
available data on the proportion of the labor force in agriculture minus agriculture's share 
of the gross domestic product (Lecaillon et al., 1984; Nielsen, 1994). Due to the fact that 
the gross domestic product is only available for some years, this study uses the net 
domestic product as a substitute. According to available data, this substitution did not 
affect the patterns of change in sector dualism coefficients. Table 2.1 displays patterns of 
change in sector dualism coefficients when using gross domestic product (GDP) and net 
domestic product (NDP). Democracy is thought to be a noble condition and is evoked by 
politicians, publicists, preachers, and demagogues to prove their unsullied intentions and 
present a just claim to popular support (de Schweinitz, 1964). Democracy is a political 
system which supplies regular constitutional opportunities for changing governing 
officials, and a social mechanism which permits the largest possible part of the population 
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Source: (see Appendix data source 3, 4, 5) 
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to influence major decisions by choosing among contenders for political office (Lipset, 
1963). Among other things, a democracy should have elections in which each vote is 
weighted equally, each individual possesses identical information about the alternatives 
presented for decisions and the order of elected officials are executed (Dahl, 1956). A 
democratic society must have pericxlic elections, decided by majority rule, in which each 
voter casts only one vote. In addition, there must be two or more parties competing for 
control, and a single party (or coalitions of parties) chosen to run the government (Downs, 
1957). Lenski (1966) identified democratic political systems not only by the extent of the 
electoral franchise but also by the extent of the existence of political liberties, which 
preserve the right of organized political opposition. In light of these definitions of political 
democracy, this study uses Gastil's political rights index and civil rights index (published 
by Freedom House), Bollen's political democracy index, as well as deaths from political 
violence, political demonstrations, numbers of newspapers, and indicators of electoral 
competition for the Provincial Assembly to measure political democracy in Taiwan. 
Bollen's political democracy index is available for two years (1960, 1965), and Taiwan's 
score (22.8) is only calculated for 1965 (Bollen, 1980:388). The Bollen's political 
democracy index consists of six elements, press freedom, freedom of group opposition, 
government sanctions, fairness of elections, executive selection, and legislative selection. 
The details of Bollen's political democracy index are described in Appendix data source 
15. The Gastil political rights index and civil rights index has been published by year since 
1973. Political rights involve the right to play a part in determining who will govern one's 
country and what the laws will be. Countries are coded with scores ranging from 1 
15 
(highest degree of liberty) to 7 (lowest degree of liberty). Civil rights are those rights the 
individual has vis a vis a vis a vis a vis a vis a vis a vis the state. Particularly important are 
the freedom of the press and the other media and the independence of the judiciary. 
Countries are coded with scores ranging from 1 (greatest civil liberty) to 7 (least civil 
liberty). The details of the political rights index and civil rights index are described in 
Appendix data source 10. To measure world-system/dependence, this study uses foreign 
investment, export dependence, and foreign aid dependence. Foreign investment has been 
used by Firebaugh and Beck (1994). Export dependence has been used by Cutright 
(1967), Bollen and Jackman (1985), Firebaugh and Beck (1994), and Lenski (1984). 
Foreign aid dependence has been used by Bornchier (1978). The position of Taiwan in the 
world economic system is listed in Table 2.2. Taiwan is among the countries of the 
periphery. The core countries in this study were selected by the amount of Taiwan's 
export that went to the countries. Taiwan's export to the us and Japan almost exceeds 
fifty percent in every year from 1952 to 1988 (Taiwan Statistical Data Book, 1989). That 
is, Taiwan depended heavily on exports to the us and Japan during the study period. In 
addition to the discussion of the effect of foreign capital and export dependence, one other 
focus in dependency theory has been the analysis of the consequences of foreign aid for 
economic development, economic structure, the structure of the state, and income 
inequality. According to Ho (1978), the U. S. aid program to Taiwan was initiated in the 
early 1950s largely in connection with the communist takeover on the mainland of China 
and was stepped up considerably in the wake of the Korean War. In the postwar period 
.TABLE 2.2 POSITION OF COUNTRIES INTO CORE, SEl\ifl-PERIPHERY, AND 16 
PERIPHERY WITIIlN MODERN SYSTEi\1S THEORY: 1965. 
Core Semi-Periphery Periphery 
Australia Argentina Afghanistan Laos 
Austria Bulgaria Albania Liberia 
Belgium Burma Algeria Libya 
Canada Cuba Benin Madagascar 
Denmark Cyprus Bolivia Mali 
France East Germany Brazil Malta 
Greece Finland Burkina Faso Mauritania 
Italy Hungary Burundi Mexico 
la.pan India Cameroon Mongolia 
Luxembourg Iran Central African Rep. Morocco 
Netherlands Ireland Chad Nepal 
Norway Israel Chile New Zealand 
Sweden Jordan China Nicaragua 
Switzerland Kenya Colombia Niger 
United Kingdom Lebanon Congo Nigeria 
IInited States Malaysia Costa Rica Panama 
West Germany Pakistan Czechoslovakia Paraguay 
Yugoslavia Peru Dominican Rep. Poland 
Philippines Ecuador Rwanda 
Portugal Egypt Saudi Arabia 
Rumania EI Salvador Senegal 
South Africa Ethiopia Sierra Leone 
South Korea Gabon Somalia 
Spain Ghana Sudan 
Sri Lanka Guatemala Syria 
Turkey Guinea Taiwan 
Uruguay Haiti Thailand 
USSR Honduras Togo 
Venezuela Iceland Trinidad and 
Indonesia Tobago 
Iraq Tunisia 




Source: Braun (1991) The Rjcb Get Richer (p.37) Chicago: Nelson-Hall Publishers 
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United States economic aid and private us and Japanese investments not only augmented 
domestic savings but also served as important conduits for advanced technology. 
Other factors in this study include the following: population with secondary 
education (Nielsen, 1994; Simpson, 1990; Firebaugh and Beck, 1994 ), the percent of 
population under age 15 (Cutright, 1967; Nielsen, 1994; Bollen and Jackman, 1985), the 
natural increase rate of population (Nielsen, 1994; Lenski, 1984 ), unemployment, export 
as a share of GNP, and savings as a share of GNP. Population with at least a secondary 
education is used as an indicator of changes in education level. The percent of population 
under age 15 and the natural increase rate of population are used as indicators of changes 
in population structure. Unemployment is used as an indicator of changes in labor force 
employment Export as a percent of GNP is used as an indicator of changes in export 
growth, and savings as a share of GNP is used as an indicator of changes in savings 
accumulation. All these variables are selected by theoretical argument or were used in 
some other studies that have been discussed in the previous chapter. 
Hypotheses 
According to the arguments described in the previous chapter, this study examines 
six hypotheses. 
Hl: Economic development has a negative relation with income inequality. 
H2: Democratization has a negative relation with income inequality. 
H3: The peripheral position and dependence on core countries has a positive relation 
with income inequality. 
H4: The expansion of education has a negative relation with income inequality. 
H5: The natural increase of population and the proportion of population under age 15 
have a positive relation with income inequality. 
H6: Employment, exports, and savings have a negative relation with income inequality. 
Data and Problems 
18 
The data gathered in this study are from 1951 to 1992, but data for some years are 
not available. There are some problems with the quality of data of income inequality 
collected on Taiwan that must be specified. Barrett and Whyte (1982) made the following 
argument 
In general Taiwan has a much better developed statistical reporting 
system than other countries at a comparable stage of development, so we 
generally accept figures from Taiwan as relatively reliable. However, the 
1953 Gini coefficient was computed from a household survey whose 
sample was not very representative. Since urban areas, where incomes 
were more unequal, were oversampled, the figure of .576 probably 
overstates the degree of inequality to some degree, perhaps by as much 20 
percent. However, more recent data derived from island-wide 
representative samples reveal a clear decline in inequality from the 1950s 
to the low level indicated in 1972. To some degree these relatively recent 
family income survey data may still underestimate nonwage (e.g., profit and 
dividend) income and thus the true extent of inequality. However, since 
such underestimation is likely to be a more serious problem in other 
developing societies with poorer statistical systems, and since there is no 
reason to assume that the extent of this underestimation has increased, the 
two conclusions reached here still seem warranted: inequality in Taiwan is 
relatively low and has declined over time (p.1066). 
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In sum, the lack of reliability of the 1953 figure does not negate the trend of 
changes in income inequality, and data for Taiwan are better than data for most of other 
developing countries. 
In another study, Kuo et al. ( 1979) made the following argument. 
For Taiwan in the 1950s, only two surveys gathered data on the 
overall distribution of income: one was conducted in 1953; the other in 
1959-60. In addition, surveys by the Joint Commission on Rural 
Reconstruction (JCRR) for 1952, 1957, 1962, and 1967 contain 
information only on fann family incomes. In 1964, the Directorate-General 
of Budget, Accounting, and Statistics (DGBAS) began to conduct 
household surveys which included information on factor components, as 
well as total family incomes (p. 10). Even when good household surveys 
became available after 1964, there are problems associated with the 
randomness of sampling and the biased nonresponses among sample 
returns. There are problems associated with differences between primary 
and published data, problems which cause the appearance of a 
"consolidation error (p. 11). "Because of this consolidation, trends in the 
Gini coefficients over time once again become more meaningful than 
absolute magnitudes (p. 13). There is no question in our minds that the 
DGBAS surveys were based on competently drawn and stratified random 
samples. Even when samples are random, however, a frequent problem is 
the underresponse of certain groups, such as wealthier families. The 
conscientiousness of DGBAS personnel and the good attitude of 
respondents to questionnaire surveys nevertheless give us a high degree of 
confidence. In addition, we know of no reason to suspect differences in 
the quality of the data over time. We are, moreover, mainly concerned 
with the change rather than the precise levels of, say, the Gini coefficients 
(p. 12). On the whole, we feel that the quality of data in Taiwan favorably 
compares with that in other LDCs (p. 13). 
In sum, again, the study also points out some problems in the data, but compared to data 
for other developing countries, data for Taiwan are relatively reliable. 
In this study the Gini coefficients of 1953 and 1959 refer to Shirley W. Y. Kuo 
(1975). In the year of 1961, the Gini coefficient is not available, but the income shared by 
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quintile is available The 1961 Gini coefficient in this study is calculated using the data of 
quintile income distribution. Other things that must be specified about the Gini 
coefficients are the following. First, according to DGBAS, the time series before 1976 
were based on ten equal divisions of disposable income and those for 1976 and thereafter, 
on un-grouped disposable income. Secondly, the formula for calculating Gini coefficient 
is the following. The example is described in Table 2.3. 
Gini = l/n times sum of (Yj - Yi), where Yj > or = Yi, 
Yj = Yi I sum of Yi, and Yi is the disposable income of the ith household. 
Method 
Hunt (1985) argues that the cross-sectional study is a frozen frame of reality 
showing what existed at one moment in time. Since it does not show motion or change, it 
cannot directly reveal how things came to be as they are or what consequences are likely 
to follow. He suggests that when researchers need to study social changes or on going 
social processes, a longitudinal design is better than cross-sectional design. 
Following the line of analyzing historical changes in income distribution in one 
particular country, this study uses period data comparison to show the changes in different 
periods of time. In Taiwan, income inequality declined rapidly during 1950 to 1970, 
leveled off during 1971to1985, and increased slightly after 1985. The major concern of 
this study concentrates on the period from 1950 to 1970. But the analysis of the period 
after 1970 is also important and interesting. By analyzing the period of 1970 to 1990, this 
TABLE 2.3 EXAMPLE OF THE CALCfilATION OF GINI COEFFICIENT 
Year: 1961 




Sum of Yi .045 
Yj 1 
Yj-Yi .955 
Sum of(Yj -Yi)= 2.112 























study discovers the changes in these factors, when income inequality almost leveled off, 
and offers some possible explanations. In addition, some results drawn from cross-
sectional study are compared in this study. Finally, this study offers prediction of changes 
in income inequality in the near future in Taiwan. 
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CHAPfERIII 
ANALYSES AND FINDINGS 
Economic Development and Income Inequality 
Kuo et al. (1979; 1981) and Ho (1978) have studied the relationship between 
economic development and income inequality in Taiwan. During 1950 to 1970 the real 
GNP grew around 9 percent each year and at the same time the Gini coefficient (indicator 
of income inequality) declined from .58 to .29. In this study, the purpose is to examine the 
variables used in cross-national study by using longitudinal data. That is, to study the 
question, "Can these variables used to explain income inequality in a society be used to 
explain the changes of income inequality over a long period?" The variables most often 
used in cross-national studies are GNT per capita, energy consumption per capita, labor 
force in agriculture, and sector dualism. The changes in GNP per capita and energy 
consumption per capita are the most efficient indicators of economic development. The 
percent of labor force in agriculture is used to measure the labor force shifting from the 
traditional agricultural sector to modern sectors (industrial and service sectors). In most 
developing countries, the more a country develops, the less the labor force will stay in 
agricultural sector. At the beginning of development, most of the labor force is in the 
agricultural sector, and then gradually it shifts from that sector to modem sectors. During 
this transition, income inequality will at first increase, and due to the shift of labor force to 
modern sectors, income inequality will decline. Sector dualism measures the productivity 
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of the labor force in agriculture. If the productivity of the labor force in agriculture is 
equal to the productivity of labor force in other modem sectors, the sector dualism will be 
zero. The larger the sector dualism coefficient, the less productivity of the labor force in 
agriculture, and theoretically the more inequality in the society. 
According to available data, in Taiwan income inequality declined gradually from 
1950 to 1970, leveled off from 1971to1985, and increased slightly after 1985. Table 3.1 
displays the changes in income inequality indicators and economic development indicators 
from 1953 to 1970. In the first decade, the 1950s, the Gini coefficient declined from .58 
to .42, and income shared by the highest quintile declined from 61.4 percent to 52 percent. 
The decrease in the Gini coefficient was 27 percent, and the decrease in the income shared 
by the highest quintile was 15.3 percent At the same time, GNP per capita increased 
from 17,155 new Taiwan (NT) dollars (at 1981 prices) to 24,356 NT dollars (at 1981 
prices). The change in GNP per capita was 42 percent. Labor force in agriculture 
declined from 56 percent to 49 .2 percent and sector dualism coefficient increased slightly 
from 17 .1 percent to 17 .6 percent. The decrease of labor force in agriculture was 12.1 
percent. The increase of GNP per capita and the decrease of the labor force in agriculture 
indicated the economic growth and labor force transition in this decade. The increase in 
sector dualism coefficient indicated that associated with the economic development there 
was a slight decrease of productivity of the labor force in agriculture. In the first decade, 
the GNP per capita had a negative relation with income inequality and the labor force in 
agriculture had a positive relation with income inequality. The relation between sector 
dualism and income inequality was not clear in this decade. Data for energy consumption 
TABLE 3.1 CHANGES IN ECONOWC DEVELOPNfENT INDICATORS AND 
INCOME INEQUALITY INDICATORS FROM 1953 TO 1970 IN 
TAIWAN 
Income Inequality Indicator 1953 1961 1966 
Gini coefficient .58 .42 .32 
Income shared by the 61.4 52.0 41.5 
highest quintile (%) 
Economic development indicator 
GNP per capita (at 1981 price) 17155 24356 33826 
Energy consumption per capita - 379.2* 499.0 
Labor force in agriculture (%) 55.4 49.2 44.2 
Sector dualism coefficient 17.1 17.6 17.9 
* 1962 data. 










per capita in the 1950s are not available. But according to some cross-national studies, 
the correlation between GNP per capita and energy consumption per capita is high 
(usually the correlation coefficient is greater than .9). For example, according to Nielsen 
(1994), the correlation coefficient between GNP per capita and energy consumption per 
capita is .96. Data for other periods in this study show the correlation coefficient between 
GNP per capita and energy consumption per capita is equal to .99. It is reasonable to say 
that the energy consumption per capita increased from some unknown figure to 379.2 
(liter oil equivalent per person) in this decade, and the relation between energy 
consumption per capita and income inequality in this period was probably negative. 
In the second decade, 1960 to 1970, the Gini coefficient declined further from .42 
to .29 and the income shared by the highest quintile declined from 52 percent to 38.7 
percent The decrease in Gini coefficient was 31 percent and the decrease in the income 
shared by the highest quintile was 25.6 percent. At the same time, GNP per capita 
increased further from 24,356 NT dollars to 45,198 NT dollars (at 1981 prices), and 
energy consumption increased from 379.2 (liter oil equivalent per person) to 689.2 (liter 
oil equivalent per person). The change in GNP per capita was 86 percent and the change 
in energy consumption per capita was 82 percent. In this decade, the labor force in 
agriculture declined further from 49.2 percent to 35.8 percent. The sector dualism 
coefficient only changed slightly from 17 .6 percent to 17 .8 percent. The decrease in labor 
force in agriculture was 27 .2 percent. In this decade, the indicators of economic 
development indicated stronger economic development than the previous decade. GNP 
per capita grew faster, and labor force in agriculture shifted a greater proportion of 
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workers to modem sectors. But this further economic growth did not enhance or worsen 
the productivity of the labor force in agriculture. The sector dualism coefficient was 
largely unchanged. In sum, in these two decades, economic development did not worsen 
the gap between the productivity of the labor force in agriculture and productivity of the 
labor force in other modern sectors. On the other hand, in this decade income inequality 
declined at almost the same rate as in the first decade. In the second decade, GNP per 
capita and energy consumption per capita still had a negative relation with income 
inequality. Labor force in agriculture had a positive relation with income inequality, and 
sector dualism did not have a clear relation with income inequality. 
Figure 3.1 displays the changes in standardized variables by year. During the two 
decades, 1950 to 1970, the Gini coefficient and income shared by the highest quintile 
changed by three standard deviations (+2 to - 1). In the same period, GNP per capita 
changed from more than one negative standard deviation to around two positive standard 
deviations, and labor force in agriculture changed from more than one positive standard 
deviation to two negative standard deviations. It was clear that GNP per capita had a 
negative relation with income inequality, and labor force in agriculture had a positive 
relation with income inequality in these two decades. Data for energy consumption were 
available from 1962. After 1962, the Gini coefficient and income shared by the highest 
quintile declined somewhat more slowly than before 1963 but still significantly. At the 
same time energy consumption increased rapidly. Therefore, after 1962 the relation 
between energy consumption per capita and income inequality was negative. In these two 
decades, the sector dualism coefficient fluctuated widely around zero standard 
FIGURE 3.1 CHANGES IN STANDARDIZED VARIABLES: 28 
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29 
deviation. Thus, according to the figure, the relation between sector dualism and income 
inequality was not clear during the two decades. In sum, the data also support the 
analyses made above. 
The slopes of GNP per capita and labor force in agriculture in the second decade 
were steeper than that in the first decade. This means that economic development in the 
second decade was more rapid than that in the first decade. In the second decade, the 
change in GNP per capita was similar to the change in energy consumption per capita. 
Finally, in these two decades the influence of economic development and labor force 
shifting from the agricultural to modern sectors on productivity of the labor force in 
agriculture fluctuated. That is, economic development and labor force shifting in some 
years had a positive effect and in some years it had a negative effect on productivity of the 
labor force in agriculture. This result differs from the theoretical argument that economic 
development increases the gap between the productivity of the labor force in agriculture 
and productivity of the labor force in other modern sectors. Table 3.2 displays changes in 
economic development and income inequality from 1970 to 1988 in Taiwan. In the 
decade, 1970 to 1980, the Gini coefficient nearly leveled off (changing from .29 to.28), 
and the income shared by the highest quintile also declined only slightly (from 38.7 percent 
to 36.8 percent). At the same time, GNP per capita increased from 45,198 NT dollars to 
94,580 NT dollars (at 1981prices)7 and energy consumption increased from 689.2 (liter 
oil equivalent per person) to 1620 (liter oil equivalent per person). The increase of GNP 
per capita was 109 percent and the increase of energy consumption was 135 percent. 
Labor force in agriculture declined from 35.8 percent to 20 percent in this decade, and the 
TABLE 3.2 CHANGES IN ECONO:MIC DEVELOPMENT AND INCOME 
INEQUALITY FROM 1970 TO 1988 IN T A1W AN 
Income Inequality Indicator 1970 1976 1980 
Gini coefficient .29 .28 .28 
Income shared by the 38.7 37.3 36.8 
highest quintile (%) 
Economic Development Indicator 
GNP per capita (at 1981 price) 45198 69964 94580 
Energy consumption per capita 698.2 1180.0 1620.0 
Labor force in agriculture (%) 35.8 28.0 20.0 
Sector dualism coefficient 17.8 14.6 10.8 
*1987 data. 










sector dualism coefficient declined from 17.8 percent to 10.8 percent. The change in labor 
force in agriculture was 44.1 percent and the change in the sector dualism coefficient was 
39.3 percent. That is, according to the changes in GNP per capita and energy 
consumption per capita, the growth of the economy in this decade was more rapid than 
the previous decade, and this growth led more of the labor force to move from the 
agricultural sector to modem sectors. On the other hand, in this period, the growth in the 
economy also enhanced the productivity of labor force in agriculture. But in sum, the 
growth in the economy, the shift of labor force from agricultural to modem sectors, and 
the improvement of productivity of the labor force in agriculture did not improve income 
inequality further. That is, the relation between economic development indicators and 
indicators of income inequality disappeared in this decade. 
The Gini coefficient increased slightly from .28 to .30 and the income shared by 
the highest quintile only increased from 36.8 percent to 38 percent from 1980 to 1988. 
Over the same period, the economy kept growing. GNP per capita increased from 94,580 
NT dollars to 146, 111 NT dollars (at 1981 prices), and energy consumption increased 
from 1,620 (liter oil equivalent per person) to 2,072.8 (liter oil equivalent per person). 
The increase of GNP per capita was 54 percent and the increase of energy consumption 
was 28 percent. On the other hand, labor force in agriculture declined further from 20 
percent to 12.7 percent and the sector dualism coefficient declined from 10.8 percent to 
6.6 percent. The decrease in the labor force in agriculture was 36.5 percent and the 
decrease in the sector dualism coefficient was 38.9 percent That is, during this period an 
additional 7 .3 percent of labor force in agriculture shifted to modem sectors and the 
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productivity of the labor force in agriculture improved further and was almost equal to the 
productivity in modem sectors. The difference was only 6.6 percent. The disappearance 
of the relationship between economic development and income inequality was still the 
same in this period. That is, the relationship between economic development and 
declining income inequality disappeared from 1980 to 1988, too. 
Figure 3.2 displays changes of standardized variables from 1950 to 1990. It is 
clear that after 1970 the relationship between economic development indicators and 
income inequality indicators disappeared. After 1970, the Gini coefficient and income 
shared by the highest quintile leveled off and increased only slightly in the 1980s, but from 
1970 to 1990, the GNP per capita and energy consumption per capita kept increasing. 
The labor force in agriculture and sector dualism coefficient declined rapidly. Further 
after 1970 the major contribution of economic development was to improve the 
productivity of the labor force in agriculture. It is clear that sector dualism coefficient 
declined rapidly after 1970. 
In sum, from 1950 to 1970 economic development really had an important effect 
on the improvement of income inequality in Taiwan. Over the next two decades, 
economic development increased the income of the majority and income inequality leveled 
off. 
Prosperity is the real friend of the women, the ethnic and the 
lumpen proletariat; the poor have gained much more from development 
than it is now fashionable to believe (Lewis, 1979; 1976). 
Such was the experience of Taiwan over the last four decades. 
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In cross-national study of income inequality, Paukert t ( 1973) gave estimates for 
56 countries, including over 40 developing countries. In his analysis the degree of 
inequality, as measured by the Gini ratio or by the equalization percentage, was linked to 
the level of the gross domestic product per capita (expressed in 1965 US dollars). He 
found a sharp increase in inequality as one moves upwards from the group of countries 
with a GDP of under 100 dollars per capita to the 101to200 dollars group of countries. 
Inequality increased further though less sharply in the 201-300 dollars group of countries. 
The countries in that group and in the next one (301-500 dollars) were those in which the 
differences in income were the most pronounced. Further up the income scale and 
especially in the group of countries with a GDP above 2000 dollars per person there was a 
clear reduction of inequality. In 1977 Harold Lydall (Lecaillon et al., 1984) examined data 
for 71 countries that had been assembled by the World Bank. He estimated that the 
turning-point of inequality, as measured by the Gini coefficient, was reached when GDP 
per capita amounted to 243 United States dollars (at 1971 prices). In these two studies, 
the peak of income inequality appears in the group of countries within 200 US dollars to 
500 US dollars per capita. According to Kuo et al. (1981), at the close of World War II, 
per capita income in Taiwan was about 70 US dollars. In 1953, GNP per capita was 176 
US dollars, and the Gini coefficient was .58. The .58 was the highest Gini score in the 
available data. From this point, the Gini coefficient declined gradually. The pattern in 
Taiwan was similar to these cross-national analyses. 
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Political Democracy and Income Inequality 
From the political democracy perspective, income inequality in a society is reduced 
by the expansion of the political base. In this section, the study examines the changes in 
the political environment in Taiwan from 1950 to 1990, and compare them to the changes 
in income inequality. The study of political democracy has concentrated on six elements: 
freedom of the press, freedom of group opposition, government sanctions, fairness of 
elections, executive selection, and legislative selection. The discussion in this section 
centers on changes in these elements. 
In 1895, Taiwan was ceded to Japan at the end of the First Sino-Japanese War and 
was developed as a Japanese colony. Reverting to Chinese sovereignty in 1945, it became 
a refuge for the Republic of China's ousted Nationalist government in 1949 following the 
Communist takeover of the Chinese Mainland. The Republic of China in Taiwan 
continues to be governed according to the constitution adopted on the Chinese Mainland 
in 1946. The state of emergency imposed in 1948, granted the president broad powers to 
override constitutional provisions. Martial law was in effect since 1949. The state is 
governed by a president. Below the president, authority rests with five Yuans (councils) -
the executive, legislative, judicial, examination, and control Yuans. The legislative Yuan 
is, in theory, elected, but before 1992 only seats created since 1972 had been filled 
through elections. In Taiwan, local elections have been held more frequently, but the 
campaigns are restricted. In Taiwan before 1980, the elective offices were powerless. At 
the local level, Taiwan is also governed as a province of China. The provincial governor 
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and the Mayor of Taipei are appointed by the central government; the provincial assembly 
is elected (The provincial governor and mayors of two special municipalities were elected 
after 1994.) 
In the late 1940s, the Nationalist government which set up in Taipei was 
dominated by its military and security sectors, as reflected by its declared commitment to 
"mainland recovery" as the regime's raison d'etre and by the repression directed against 
opponents of the Mainlander-dominated government. Taiwan in this period was a 
garrison state (Chan and Clark, 1992). The KMT did not try to hang onto power simply 
through repression and terror. During the 1950s the regime tried to generate some 
popular support and legitimacy both by promoting economic development and an 
increased standard of living, and by introducing political reforms that involved the creation 
of a new elite segment. In the early 1950s the regime created a system of elections for 
local governments and the Provincial Assembly, while leaving the "national lx>dies" under 
the control of officials elected on the mainland in the late 1940s. There were two other 
political parties that retreated from mainland China to Taiwan, but the "Kuomintang" 
(Nationalist party) dominated these elections. At the same time, the government 
prohibited the formation of an opposition party or other new political parties. 
Theoretically, there were three political parties in Taiwan in the but the other two parties 
did not have a significant political influence. Thus, during the 1950s in the political and 
social realms, authoritarian control was supplemented by limited liberalization in local 
politics. 
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Table 3.3 displays the changes in income inequality and changes in political 
environment from 1950 to 1970. In the 1950s, the Gini coefficient declined from .58 to 
.42, and income shared by the highest quintile decline from 61.4 percent to 52 percent. In 
the beginning of the decade due to a reign of repression and terror, there were large 
numbers of deaths ( 47 51) from political violence. [This did not include the events on 
February 28, 1947 which led to massive reprisals and the slaughter of up to 10,000 
Taiwanese.] In the same period, the number of political executions and government 
sanctions was also higher than in other periods. In sum, in this first decade the number of 
political demonstrations, strikes, and riots declined from 15 to one. The number of deaths 
from political violence declined from 47 51 to 595. The number of political executions 
declined from 317 to one, and the number of government sanctions declined from 45 to 
29. On the other hand, the amount of nonpolitical civic organizations and nonpolitical 
periodicals increased significantly, increasing from 2560 to 4973 and from 245 to 686 
respectively. In 1954, the "Association of Broadcasters" was allowed. The changes in 
electoral indicators (percent of candidates elected, percent of KMTs share of the votes, 
and percent of KMT's share of the seats) and changes in the number of newspapers were 
minor. Thus, in this decade, the changes in political democracy were limited, but the 
society become more stable. 
In the 1960s, tolerance for political opposition was quite limited, as evidenced by 
the arrests of Chein Lei in 1960 for trying to organize to an opposition party and Peng 
Mingmin in 1964 for writing pamphlets advocating the overthrow of the KMT. In the 
there were three electoral campaigns for local governments and the Provincial A~sembly. 
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INEQUALITY FROM 1950 TO 1970 INT AIW AN 
Income Inequality Indicator Early 1950s Early 1960s Early 1970s 
Gini coefficient .58 .42 .29 
Income shared by top quintile (%) 61.4 52.0 38.6 
Indicators of Changes in Political Environment 
Political demonstrations, strikes, 
and .riots 15 I 9 
Deaths from political violence 4751 595 3 
Political executions 371 1 1 
Government sanctions 45 29 28 
Number of civic organizations 2560 4973 5890 
Civic organizations' membership 
as percent of population 
aged 15-64 29.4 40.0 37.8 
Number of newspapers 30 31 31 
Number of periodicals 245 686 1534 
Percent of candidates elected 
to the Provincial Assembly 51.8 54.0 60.3 
Percent ofKMTs share of the 
Provincial Assembly votes 69 68 69 
Percent ofKMT's share of the 
Provincial Assembly seats 84 82 80 
Political index - 22.8* 5.5** 
*Bollen's ~ **Gastil's 
Source: (see Appendi~ data source 1, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15) 
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In 1960s there were three electoral campaigns for local governments and the Provincial 
Assembly, too. The difference was that "independents" were able to win some elections 
(for example, they won the mayorships in three of the five largest cities in 1964). Thus, 
local politicians were forced to become more responsive to their constituencies, and a 
considerable Taiwanization of the lower levels of the party and government occurred. In 
the same period, a broadening of the elite segments in the regime occurred. The push for 
rapid growth necessitated bringing technocrats and administrators, many of whom had 
been educated at leading U. S. universities, into the top levels of government. Income 
inequality declined gradually but substantially from .42 (Gini) to .29 (Gini). Changes in 
the number of political executions and government sanctions are minor, and the number of 
political demonstrations, strikes, and riots increased. Because martial-law prohibited the 
founding of new newspapers, in the 1960s the number of newspapers stayed at about 30. 
Changes in election indicators (percent of candidates elected, percent of KMT's share of 
the votes, and percent of KMT's share of the seats) were minor, among which only the 
percent of candidates elected to the Provincial Assembly increased from 54 percent to 
60.3 percent. That is, there were fewer candidates relatively to seats and the competition 
in the electoral campaign was less competing. Very significant progress still occurred in 
the form of published materials and organizations. Three television stations were founded, 
but were still under the control of the government or KMT. In sum, when we translate the 
Bollen's 1965 100 scale political democracy index into Gastil's seven-point index and 
reverse the direction, we find that in 1965 the Bollen's political democracy index for 
Taiwan (22.8) was equal to 5.4 on Gastil's political index. Comparing this figure to 1973 
Gastil's political index for Taiwan (5.5), we would find that in the second decade the 
changes in political democracy were minor. 
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Politically, significant changes in the authoritarian style of rule began to evolve in 
the 1970s. The island's successful modernization and creation of an Islander (native 
Taiwanese) business community stimulated pressure for increased participation and 
government responsiveness. When Chiang Ching-kuo became premier in 1972, he 
instituted a more liberal program that included bringing younger and more educated 
officials into top leadership positions, gradually increasing the power granted to Islanders 
in the government and party. A very important component of this liberalization was that 
the position of the opposition began to improve. While the formation of an opposition 
party was still illegal, an informal association of oppositions began to grow after the late 
1970s. 
The trends of liberalization of Taiwan's politics over the 1970s and the first half of 
the 1980s increased the scope of free speech and electoral competition and reduced the 
power of conservatives within the regime. In the meantime the "tangwai--outside the 
party" used the more liberal atmosphere of the 1980s to stretch the limits of political 
discourse. The cumulative movement toward political liberalization reached a more 
dramatic crescendo during 1986 to 1989. The first step was the open formation of an 
opposition party, Democratic Progressive Party (DPP). The next step was the formal 
abolition of martial law and the Emergency Decree that had been applied to Taiwan since 
1949. Furthermore, the balance of power within the KMT appeared to be moving in a 
more liberal direction. Chiang Ching-kuo's sudden death in January 1988 threw this trend 
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into some question, but the new president Lee Teng-hui (who is an Islander) appeared to 
be consolidating power, moving younger and more liberal leaders into top positions, and 
pushing through innovative domestic and foreign policies. Table 3.4 displays changes in 
the political environment and income inequality during 1970 to 1990 in Taiwan. In these 
two decades, income inequality first leveled off around .29 (Gini coefficient) during most 
of the period and at the end of the period it increased slightly. In the 1970s, political 
demonstrations, strikes, riots, and government sanctions were less than in other periods. 
Data in the 1980s were not available, but due to the abolition of martial law, the 
demonstrations, strikes increased significantly at the end of the 1980s and this was a 
phenomena of democracy transition. In the second half of the 1980s, the DPP emerged as 
a major political opposition of the KMT. This process toward political liberalization and 
partisan competition, however, has also produced a concomitant increase in the incidence 
of violent protests and mass demonstrations. (In the early 1990s, the number of 
demonstration, strikes, and riots were decreased gradually.) A more significant expansion 
still occurred in the number of civic organizations and periodicals. During these two 
decades the number of civic organization increased from 5980 to 12605 and the number of 
periodicals increased from 1534 to 3748, some political (including opposition) but 
undoubtedly a large majority of wholly nonpolitical publications. The unique phenomenon 
in this period occurred after the abolition of martial law. The number of newspapers 
increased dramatically form 31 to 124. As indicators of election, KMT's share of the 
votes and KMT's share of the seats was declined gradually. In sum, during these two 
decades, Gastil political rights index changed from 6 to 4 and civil rights index changed 
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TABLE 3.4 CHANGES IN POLITICAL ENVIRONMENT AND INCON!E 
INEQUALITY FROM 1970 TO 1990 IN TAIWAN 
Income Inequality Indicator Early 1970s Late 1970s Late 1980s 
Gini coefficient .29 .29 .30 
Income shared by top quintile (%) 38.6 37.5 38.0 
Indicators of Changes in political Environment 
Political demonstrations, strikes, 
and riots 9 1 * 
Government sanctions 28 
., 
* j 
Number of civic organizations 5980 8080 12605 
Civic organizations' membership 
as percent of population 
aged 15-64 37.8 41.3 69.4 
Number of newspapers 31 31 124 
Number of periodicals 1534 1772 3748 
Percent of candidates elected 
to the Provincial Assembly 60.3 61.6 49.0 
Percent of KMT's share of the 
Provincial Assembly votes 69 66 62 
Percent ofKMT's share of the 
Provincial Assembly seats 80 73 70 
Political rights index 6 5 4 
Civil rights index 5 5 3 
*Data are not available. 
Source: (see Append~ data source I, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14) 
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from 5 to 3. If we translate the two seven scale indexes into a 100 scale score, the 
improvement of political democracy in these two decade was around 30 percent It was 
significant, but in the same period income inequality did not change. That is, the level of 
democracy has not apparently helped to reduce income inequality in Taiwan. This result 
was consistent with the conclusion in the cross-national study made by Bollen and 
Jackman (1985), i.e., political democracy did not have a significant effect on income 
inequality. 
World System/Dependence and Income Inequality 
According to Wallerstein (1974), the contemporary world system consists of a 
single world market, but of a multitude of states which vary greatly in political power, in 
accessibility by various social classes and economic interests, and in their capability to 
distort markets and rig prices in favor of some of their constituents. In W allerstein 's view, 
there are three different positions in the global economy: core, semiperiphery, and 
periphery. The core dominates, the periphery suffers. And the distinction between 
semiperiphery and periphery decreases Third World solidarity against the industrial core. 
But, there are many different branches of the dependency and world system paradigm. 
Some focus on economic dependence, some focuses on political dependence, some focus 
on military dependence, and some focus on treaty memberships. This study concentrates 
on economic dependence and its relation with income inequality. The variables of 
dependence used in this study include foreign investment, foreign aid, and export to core 
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countries. The variable of foreign investment only includes current flows of foreign 
investment. In the study of foreign investment, there are two types of foreign capital. 
One is current flows of foreign capital, and the other is cumulative foreign capita in a 
country, such as stocks. According to Bomschier et al. (1978), flows of direct foreign 
investment and aid have had the short-term effect of increasing the relative rate of 
economic growth of countries, and stocks of direct foreign investment and aid have had 
the cumulative, long-term effect of decreasing the relative rate of economic growth of 
countries. That is, the relationships between the flows of foreign capital and economic 
development, and between the stocks of foreign capital are different. Of course, a 
country's position in the world system is changeable, by political performance and 
economic growth. For example, Barrett and Whyte (1982) suggested "that successes in 
economic growth and penetration of markets in the core countries were thrusting Taiwan 
from peripheral up to semi-peripheral status. "The other example is Japan. According to 
Weede and Kummer (1985), Japan is listed among semi-peripheral countries. But 
according to Braun (1991), Japan is listed among core countries. In this study, due to the 
historical relation between Taiwan and Japan in the early twenty century and the reality 
that in the last several decades both Taiwan's export and import was heavily dependent on 
Japan, Japan is a core country to Taiwan. 
According to Barrett and Whyte (1982), Taiwan's dependence on foreign capital 
can be divided into three phases. The first stage was during 1895 to 1945. In this stage 
Taiwan was a colony and dependent on Japan. The second stage was during the early 
1950s to the early 1960s. In this stage, Taiwan was heavily dependent on US aid, US aid 
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made up around 40 percent of gross domestic capital formation. The third stage was after 
the early 1960s. Taiwan used policy to induce foreign investment to offset the lack of 
foreign aid. · This study concentrates on stages two and three only. 
According to Chan and Clark (1992), Taiwan was heavily dependent on the US in 
military and political policy during the 1950s and the 1960s. Washington saw Taiwan as 
an essential link in its containment policy in East Asia. It pumped massive sums of 
economic and military aid to the KMT regime. Washington's generosity in providing 
massive aid to the KMT state derived from Taiwan's geo-strategic location at the fringe of 
the Eurasian land mass. The United States was motivated to support and sustain the KMT 
state because it wanted to deny the island to Beijing (which was perceived to be a client of 
Moscow). According to Barrett and Whyte (1982), after World War II and the Chinese 
Civil War, Taiwan became a political client of the United States. In sum, Taiwan's 
structural position as a forward post in the rimland of Eurasia, as a rival government of 
China, and as a former colony of Japan enhanced Washington's willingness to contribute 
to its well-being. The result was that during this period in political, military, and the treaty 
membership matters Taiwan was heavily dependent on the United States. 
After the Japanese lost the war, the island was returned to China in 1945. It 
suffered under a corrupt and incompetent warlord governor, Chen Yi, who did little to 
repair the war-damaged economy. During the next few years, living standards declined, 
runaway inflation consumed existing wealth, and unemployment worsened (Lau, 1990). 
During 1948 and 1949, the Chinese Nationalists found refuge in Taiwan as they lost the 
Chinese Civil War. More than a million and a half "Mainlanders" fled to Taiwan at that 
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time. Due to the above reasons, in that time Taiwan was the poorest country among the 
developing countries (GNP per capital less than 70 US dollars). There was a serious lack 
of capital. After the outbreak of the Korean War, Washington regarded Taiwan as an 
important regional location, and began to pump massive sums of economic and military 
aid to Taiwan. According to Chan and Clark (1992), foreign aid and foreign markets were 
important for Taiwan, but foreign investment was never dominated in Taiwan's economy. 
Overall foreign investment in Taiwan has been much lower than in many other Third 
World countries, especially those in Latin America. Foreign investment only played an 
important role in the export surge of 1963-73. In terms of external economic dependency, 
the record is more mixed. Taiwan has been moderately dependent upon foreign capital. 
For example, on Bornschier and Chase-Dunn's (Chan and Clark, 1992) indices for MNC 
(multinational corporation) penetration in the mid 1970s, the island ranked in the top third 
of all developing countries in current inflows of capital, but was relatively low in total 
capital stock because of the recency of major MNC investments. Taiwan's export has 
ranked in the top quarter of the world in trade partner concentration and trade/GNP ratio 
since the mid 1970s. 
Over the period from 1952 to 1968 more than 1.7 billion US dollars in aid was 
extended to Taiwan, excluding aid in the military assistance program (the latter totaled 
about 2.3 billion US dollars over the years). From 1958 to 1965 Taiwan ranked fifth in 
the world in the total amount of U. S. aid per capita, with almost six times as much aid 
received per capita as the average for 120 countries. Over 80 percent of the aid was in the 
form of grants. In the 1950s, U. S. aid provide almost 40 percent of gross domestic 
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capital formation (GDCF). Around half of the aid was spent on military, and rest of it 
financed the investment in agriculture and infrastructure and also covered Taiwan's trade 
and budgetary deficits. According to Jacoby (1966), the U. S. aid helped to alleviate the 
island's crushing defense burden and enabled the regime to stabilize and then to revive its 
economy. In the absence of the US aid Taiwan's annual GNP growth rate would have 
been cut by half, its per capital income would have been reduced by three quarters, and it 
would have taken the island 30 more years to reach its 1964 living standards (Jacoby, 
1966). Private foreign investment was minimal in the 1950s, constituting less than 1.8 
percent of GDCF per year. In sum, in this period the net flows of foreign capital 
constituted around 35 percent of gross domestic capital formation. In the same period 
exports to the US and Japan was around 50 percent. That is, in the 1950s Taiwan's 
exports were heavily concentrated in the two countries. Income inequality reduced 
gradually form .58 (Gini) to around .42 (Gini), and income shared by the top quintile 
declined from 61.4 percent to around 52 percent In this decade foreign capital and export 
dependence had a positive contribution to the economic growth (annual growth rate was 9 
percent). But the direct relation between world system/dependence and income inequality 
was mixed. 
The data on Table 3.5 display changes in income inequality and dependency 
indicators from 1953 to 1970. In the 1950s, income inequality improved gradually. But 
the percent of exports to theUS and Japan almost did not change. At the same time, 
foreign investment as a share of gross domestic capital formation decreased significantly 
from 1.6 percent to .04 percent and US aid as a share of gross domestic capital formation 
TABLE 3.5 CHANGES IN INCOME INEQUALITY AND DEPENDENCE 
FROM 1953 TO 1970 IN TAIWAN. 
Indicators of Income Inequality 1953 1959 1966 
Gini coefficient .58 .44* ... ? . .J-
'-.. 
Income shared by the 
highest quintile (%) 61.4 52.0** 41.5 
Dependency Indicators 
Foreign investment as a 
share of gross domestic 
capital formation (%) 1.60 .04 4.40 
Percent of export to the 
US and Japan 49.8 50.l 45.6 
US aid as a share of 
gross domestic capital 
formation (%) 41.0 36.2 5.8 
Net flows of foreign capital 
as a share of gross 
domestic capital 








*Data refer to Barrett and Whyte ( 1982) "Dependency theory and Taiwan: analysis of a 
deviant case." p. 1069. American Journal of sociology 87:1064-89. · 
** 1961 data. 
Data source: (see Appendix data source 1, 16, 17) 
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declined from 41 percent to 33. 8 percent. The net flows of foreign capital as a share of 
gross domestic capital formation increased from 36.9 percent to 45.6 percent. According 
to these changes, in this period the relation between income inequality and export 
dependence was not obvious. Foreign investment had a positive relation with income 
inequality. US aid had a slightly positive relation with income inequality. The net flows of 
foreign capital had a slightly negative relation with income inequality. In the 1960s, the 
Gini coefficient declined from .42 to around .29 and the income shared by the top quintile 
declined from 52 percent to around 39 percent. US aid declined sharply and then ceased 
in 1968. Due to a government policy that encouraged foreign investment, foreign 
investment as a share of gross domestic capital formation increased dramatically from .04 
percent to 9 .6 percent by the end of the decade. Government monetary policy also 
changed to increased interest rates in order to induce people to save. The combination of 
this change with the first change led to sharply declining net flows of foreign capital as a 
share of gross domestic capital formation. The figure changed from 45.6 to near zero. 
Finally, the percent of exports to the US and Japan fluctuated around 50 percent. 
Nevertheless, the relation between the export dependence and income inequality was still 
not clear. Foreign investment had a negative relation with income inequality. This was 
different from the previous decade. U. S. aid still had a positive relation with income 
inequality. The net flows of foreign capital had a positive relation with income inequality. 
Figure 3.3 displays changes in standardized variables from 1950 to 1970. The Gini 
coefficient and income shared by the highest quintile declined gradually and significantly 
during these two decades.US aid also declined gradually and significantly. That is, the 
FIGURE 3.3 CHANGES IN STANDARDIZED VARIABLES: 50 
DEPENDENCE INDICATORS AND INEQUALITY, 1953-1970. 
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relation between US aid and income inequality was positive in these two decades. Percent 
of export to the US and Japan fluctuated around zero standard deviation. The fluctuation 
in the percent of exports to these two countries makes the relation between export 
dependence and income inequality unclear. Foreign investment fluctuated slightly around 
negative one standard deviation but increased significantly in the second decade. That is, 
in the first decade the relation between foreign investment and income inequality was not 
clear, and in the second decade the relation between foreign investment and income 
inequality was negative. 
In the next two decades, 1970 to 1990, income inequality changed very little. 
Foreign investment peaked in 1968-71 and then fell back substantially to alx>ut 3 percent 
of GDCF during the 1970s and early 1980s before climbing again to alx>ut 7 percent of 
GDCF in the late 1980s. Foreign capital has dominated a few important export industries, 
such as electronics, but it never became strong enough to dominate the economy. 
Because of the US aid, in the 1950s and early 1960s the net inflows of foreign capital 
were over one third of domestic investment. With the end of foreign aid, the amount of 
net inflows dropped drastically. In the 1970s, the balance of capital flows turned negative. 
Capital outflows began to escalate during the 1980s, reaching the level of total domestic 
investment by mid decade. This development represents the rising foreign investments 
made by Taiwan's businessmen, who have been motivated by the desire to preserve 
overseas scales against protectionism in the developed world, particularly in the United 
States, and to exploit cheap labor in the developing world (for example, Philippines). 
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In the export dependency aspect, as seen above, the percent of exports to the 
United States and Japan have almost always accounted for about 50 percent in the first 
two decades. In the 1970s, this figure still was around fifty percent, and it jumped to 
almost 60 percent in the mid 1980s. Taiwan has been marked by substantial dependence 
upon foreign markets, although the degree of this dependence has varied considerably 
both over time and among specific subclimensions. Its successful export from the early 
1960s to the late 1980s certainly indicated that these ties to international markets did not 
worsen the economy and income inequality. 
Table 3.6 displays the changes in income inequality and dependency indicators 
from 1970 to 1987. In these two decades, the Gini coefficients were around .29 and 
income shared by the highest quintile were around 38 percent. The changes in these two 
indicators were little. But, foreign investment declined from 9.6 percent to 3.3 percent in 
the 1970s and then increased from 3.3 percent to 7.4 percent in the 1980s. The changes 
in foreign investment were both negative and positive in these two decades. The link 
between changes in foreign investment and the changes in income inequality is not clear. 
Further, export dependence declined a little in the 1970s and increased from 45.1 percent 
to 57 .1 percent in the 1980s. As Comparing the changes in export dependence with 
changes in income inequality, the relation is not obvious. The same is true for the net 
flows of foreign capital as a share of gross domestic capital formation. It first increased 
from .09 percent to 3.9 percent in the 1970s and then declined from 3.9 percent to 
negative 99 percent. The dramatic change in the direction of flows of capital stemmed 
from Taiwan's businessmen largely invested in the developing countries. 
TABLE 3.6 CHANGES IN INCO!vfE INEQUALITY AND DEPENDENCE 
INDICATORS FROM 1970 TO 1987 IN TAIWAJ."'l. 
Indicators of Income Inequality 1970 1980 1987 
Gini coefficient .29 .28 .30 
Income shared by the 
highest quintile (%) 38.7 36.8 38.0 
Dependency Indicators 
Foreign investment as a 
share of gross domestic 
capital formation (%) 9.6 3.3 7.4 
Percent of export to the 
US and Japan 52.7 45.1 57.1 
Net flows of foreign capital 
as a share of gross 
domestic capital 
formation (%) 0.9 3.9 -99.0 
US aid as a share of gross 
domestic capital 
formation * * * 
*No further economic aid commitments were made to Taiwan after 1967 (Barrett and 
Whyte 1982). 
Source: (see Appendix data source 1, 16, 17) 
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Figure 3.4 displays the changes in the standardized variables from 1950 to 1990. 
After 1970, the Gini coefficient and income shared by the highest quintile almost leveled 
off and percent of exports to the U. S . and Japan fluctuated around zero standard 
deviation. Foreign investment first declined significantly in the 1970s and increased 
significantly in the 1980s, but declined at the end of 1980s. 
In sum, during the forty year period only U. S. aid had a positive relation with 
income inequality. Other dependency indicators fluctuated during the study period, and 
their relationships with income inequality were not clear. Foreign aid in the 1950s and 
early 1960s helped the recovery of the economy and at the same time income inequality 
improved significantly. But if one looks closely at changes in the U. S. aid and income 
inequality, the relationships between the foreign aid and income inequality are positive. 
This result fits to the prediction of dependency theory. In the 1950s the flows of foreign 
capital consisted of US aid, in the form of grants. It did not hold stocks in Taiwan. In 
fact, America had little established investment or market stake in Taiwan and only at a 
comparatively late stage did US policy evolve a concern with fostering American private 
investment in Taiwan (Schreiber, 1970). According to Bornschier et al. (1978), flows of 
direct foreign aid have had the short-term effect of increasing the relative rate of economic 
growth of countries. This U. S. aid was really helpful for the economy in that time. This 
also fits the dependency argument. With economic growth, income inequality improved at 
the same time. 
FIGURE 3.4 CHANGES IN STANDARDIZED VARIABLES: 55 
DEPENDENCE INDICATORS AND INEQUALITY, 1953-1990. 
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Other Social Factors and Income Inequality 
In the following sections, social factors are discussed. These factors include 
education, natural increase of population, population under age 15, savings, export, and 
employment. First, the changes in education, population growth, and population structure 
(age under 15) are discussed. The changes in savings, exports, and employment are 
discussed in the next section. 
As early as 1848 John Stuart Mill predicted that the diffusion of education would 
lead to a decrease in inequality. One of Ahluwalia's (Lecaillon et al., 1984: 11) most 
important conclusions is that the distribution of incomes depends partly on variables on 
which socioeconomic policy can exercise an influence--for example, the level of education 
and the rate of population growth. According to his estimates, an increase from 250 to 
500 dollars in income per capita gives rise to a reduction from 12 to 10 percent in the 
share of total income accruing to the poorest 40 percent; it would be possible, however, to 
take countervailing measures to augment that share, which, for example, increases by 3.4 
percentage points when the literacy rate is increased from 40 to 100 percent and by 1.7 
percentage points when the annual rate of population growth is reduced from 3 to 1.5 
percent. 
The demographic transition and educational expansion from 1953 to 1970 is 
displayed on Table 3. 7. Although some education was available to the people when the 
island was under Japanese occupation it was usually limited to the primary level (Kuo et 
al., 1981). Advanced education was rare and almost always limited to medical science. 
TABLE 3.7 CHANGES IN SOCIAL FACTORS AND INCON!E INEQUALITY 
FROM 1953 TO 1970 IN TAIWAN. 
Indicators of Income Inequality 1953 1961 1966 
Gini coefficient .58 .42 .32 
Income shared by the 
highest quintile (%) 61.4 52.0 41.5 
Social Factors 
Percent of population 
with secondary 
education 10.4 14.9 18.3 
Natural increase rate 
of population 35.8 31.6 26.9 
(per 1000) 
Percent of population 
under age 15 42.6* 45.9 44.0 
--
*1952 data 









After Taiwan was restored to Chinese sovereignty, the government of the Republic of 
China made an effort to promote education. Not only was a large portion of government 
money spent on education, but equal opportunity for education was also emphasized. As 
result, the level and rate of education increased gradually and greatly. Six-year public 
education was universal. The illiteracy rate of persons 6 years old and older decreased 
from 55 percent in 1946 to 28.9 in 1959. The percent of the population with secondary 
education increased from 10.4 percent in 1953 to 14.9 percent in 1961. College students 
as a percentage of population increased from .12 percent to .32 percent in 1960. In this 
period the primary focus of the government was elementary education. The expansion in 
secondary education was moderate and the expansion in college education was minor. 
Demographically, the period between post war and 1960 was characterized by a high rate 
of population growth. The natural increase rate of population occurred rapidly from 20 
per 1000 in 1947 to around 35 percent per 1000 in the 1950s. This pattern can be found 
in several other countries. Due to World War II the percent of population under age 15 
increased from 40 percent in 1930 to 43.32 in 1946. In the 1950s due to the high birth rate 
and the already low death rate, the percent of population under age 15 increased further 
from 42.6 percent to 45.9 percent by 1961. In the same period, the Gini coefficient 
declined from .58 in 1953 to .42 in 1961 and income shared by top quintile decline from 
61.4 percent in 1953 to 52 percent in 1961. 
In the 1960s, the illiteracy rate of persons 6 years old and older decreased further 
from 28.9 percent in 1959 to 14.7 percent in 1970. The percent of population with 
secondary education increased dramatically from 14.9 percent in 1961 to 30.2 percent in 
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1970. This result was due to general improvements in the economic condition and to the 
fact that military personnel were included in population statistics in 1969. College student 
as percentage of population increased from .32 percent in 1960 to 1.39 percent in 1970. 
In 1968 nine years of education was made compulsory. In sum, the 1960s was the period 
of promotion of junior high education and secondary education also expanded rapidly. 
After the so called "baby boom" period, in the 1960s the natural rate of population 
increase began to slow. The rate declined from 31.6 per thousand in 1961to22.3 per 
thousand by 1970. At the same time, the percent of population under age 15 declined 
from 45.9 percent in 1961 to 39.7 percent in 1970. Income inequality kept declining as 
well. The Gini coefficient declined from .42 in 1961 to .29 in 1970 and income shared by 
the highest quintile declined from 52 percent in 1961to38.7 percent in 1970. 
Figure 3.5 displays changes of standardized variables in this section. The Gini 
coefficient and income shared by the highest quintile declined gradually and significantly. 
Population with secondary education expanded significantly, and the natural rate of 
population growth at first declined slowly and then dropped rapidly. The percentage of 
population under age 15 first increased rapidly and dropped dramatically in the second 
decade. In these two decades, the expansion of education had a negative relation with 
income inequality, but the relations between demographic factors and income inequality 
were mixed. The natural rate of population growth declined slightly in the 1950s and 
declined significantly in the second decade, and income inequality declined significantly in 
both decades. In sum, the population growth had a moderate positive relation with 
income inequality. In terms of population structure, the population under age 15 
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increased slightly in the first decade and declined slightly in the second decade. 
Comparing this change to changes in income inequality, the relation between population 
under age 15 and income inequality was ooth negative and positive at different times. 
Comparing the findings to the theoretical argument and some cross-sectional 
studies, first, expansion of education had a negative relation with income inequality. This 
was consistent with theoretical argument and the conclusion drawn by Nielsen (1994) and 
Simpson (1990). Secondly, demographically the outcome was somewhat different from 
the theoretical argument and the findings of Bollen and Jackman (1985) and Ahluwalia 
(1976). Population growth had a slightly positive relation with income inequality in the 
1950s and it had a stronger positive relation with income inequality in the 1960s, which 
was consistent with theoretical prediction and the cross-sectional findings. But the 
percentage of population under age 15 had a negative relation with income inequality in 
the 1950s. This was different from theoretical prediction. In theoretical argument and 
cross-sectional studies, scholars emphasize that the percent of dependency (population 
under age 15) has a positive effect on income inequality, but in Taiwan's study the 
dependency population expanded in the 1950s and revolved around 44 percent of total 
population and only declined slightly at the end of 1960s. Why did not the increase 
worsen income inequality in Taiwan? Economists offer possible explanations. One is that 
in the 1950s and 1960s the productivity in agriculture improved significantly and this 
improvement was partly due to the young unpaid labor force in agriculture. Further, in 
early 1960s the policy of export promotion encouraged the establishment of 
manufacturing organizations that were very labor intensive, and pa.rt of the young laoor 
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force plunged into these manufactures. In sum, part of the dependency population was 
not like the prediction, because much of this population was not really dependent ! On the 
contrary they were helpful to the economy and increased the income of their families. 
Table 3.8 displays changes in social factors and income inequality from 1970 to 
1990. In the 1970s and the first half of 1980s, income inequality leveled off and only in 
the late 1980s worsened a little. In addition, the illiteracy rate of persons 6 years old and 
older declined from 14.7 percent in 1970 to 7.4 percent in 1988. Due to the extension of 
public education to nine years, the percent of primary school graduates enrolling in junior 
high school increased from 78.6 percent in 1970 to 99.1 in 1988. The percent of the 
population with secondary education increased almost at the same speed as in previous 
decade. It increased from 30.2 percent in 1970 to 54.3 percent in 1987. The natural rate 
of population growth declined moderately from 22.3 per thousand to 18.6 per thousand in 
the 1970s and declined more rapidly from 18.6 per thousand to 11.4 per thousand in the 
1980s. Finally, the percent of population under age 15 declined moderately from 39.7 
percent to 27 .1 percent over the two decades. In sum, during these two decades, there 
was no relation between the social factors and income inequality. 
Figure 3.6 displays changes in the standardized variables by year. After 1970 the 
percent of population with secondary education kept increasing and the percent of 
population under age 15 kept declining, but income (both Gini coefficient and income 
shared by top quintile) differentials leveled off. Only in the second half of the 1980s did 
the natural increase rate of population also level off. That is, after the mid 1980s income 
TABLE 3.8 CHANGES IN SOCIAL FACTORS AND INCOlVfE INEQUALITY 
FROM 1970 TO 1990 IN TAIWAN. 
Indicators of Income Inequality 1970 1976 1980 
Gini coefficient .29 .28 .28 
Income shared by the 
highest quintile (%) 38.7 37.3 36. 
Social Factors 
Percent of population 
with secondary 
education 30.2 37.5 44.0 
Natural increase rate 
of population 22.3 21.2 18.6 
(per 1000) 
Percent of population 
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inequality did not change and population had an exponential growth rate, but this did not 
show any effect on income inequality. 
Exports, Savings, and Employment 
In aspects of economic development, political democratization, and income 
improvement, Taiwan's case is unusual among developing countries. Scholars have tried 
to point to some special factors to explain these anomalous. In discussing income 
inequality, they point to factors like land reform, tax policy, size of companies, exports, 
savings, and employment to account for changes in income distribution. In the 1970s and 
early 1980s, studies concentrated on land reform and tax policy (Kuo et al., 1979; 1981; 
Ho, 1978). In the 1980s, studies concentrated on business size. Some studies were done 
by one of Taiwan's institutions, Zhonghua Zhengxinso, and also by some foreign 
institutions, such as the International Center for Economic Growth in the U. S. Some 
results of the above studies supported their argument that those factors had an effect on 
income inequality. For example, land reform improved the income of fanners and income 
inequality declined at the same time (Kuo et al., 1979). Taxation redistributed income and 
also improved income inequality. Table 3.9 displays the effect of direct taxation on the 
Gini coefficient (Kuo et al., 1981: 140). In the aspect of business size, in the 1980s the 
top four Korean enterprise groups (chaebol) controlled around 45 percent of the GNP. In 
Japan economy was dominated by large, powerful, and relatively stable enterprise groups 
(Hamilton and Biggart, 1988). According to Scitovsky (Lau, 1990: 152), between 1960 
and 1973 Japan's ten largest general trading companies handled half of its exports and 
TABLE 3.9 GINI COEFFICIENTS OF INCOrvfE DISTRIBUTION BEFORE AND 
AFTER DIRECT TAXES FROM 1964 TO 1976 IN TAIWAN. 
1964 1968 1972 1976 
Gini Coefficient Before 
Direct Taxes .3282 .3348 .2953 .2894 
Gini Coefficient After 
Direct Taxes .3275 .3309 .2912 .2845 
Ratio of Gini Coefficient 
Before Tax to Gini 
Coefficient After Tax 1.002 1.012 1.014 1.017 
Sources: Department of Budget, Accounting and Statistics, Taiwan Provincial 
Government, Report on the Survey of Family Income and Expenditure, 
Taiwan Province, Republic of China; Bureau of Budget, Accounting and 
Statistics, Taipei City Government, Report on the Survey ofFamily Income 




almost two-thirds of its imports. But in Taiwan the five largest business groups 
Gituanquye) only contributed 5.5 percent of the gross national product in the early 1980s 
(Hamilton and Biggart, 1988). The largest 100 business groups contributed 29.5 percent 
of GNP in 1974 and 31.7 percent of GNP in 1983 (Hamilton and Biggart, 1988). 
Scitovsky (Lau, 1990: 10) emphasizes that the small businesses in Taiwan played a 
significant role in reducing income inequality. Nevertheless, this study centers on exports, 
savings, and employment 
In the late 1940s due to the ruin wrought by World War II and the delay of the 
Civil War in China, there was a great shortage of goods for everyday sustenance. In this 
period and early 1950s trade balance was always in a deficit. For example, the trade 
balance in 1952 was negative 71 million US dollars. In the worst year (1954) it was 
negative 118 million US dollars. Like other developing countries, at this time government 
policy concentrated on import substitution. The government tried to reduce or control the 
deficit in trade balance. In the 1950s. growth in imports was significant. At the same 
time, growth in exports was also significant, especially in the agricultural sector. In the 
whole decade exports as a percentage of GNP increased around 3 percent, from 8.6 
percent in 1953 to 11.2 percent in 1961. Table 3.10 displays changes in income inequality 
and in exports, savings, and unemployment from 1953 to 1970. 
In the 1950s the changes in savings were affected by the several factors. First, due 
to post-war high inflation, the old currency was devalued to the point that 40,000 dollars 
of old currency was equal to only one new currency, a policy that was put into effect on 
June 15, 1949. Secondly, high inflation in the period made both banks and individuals to 
TABLE 3.10 CHANGES IN SPECIAL SOCIAL FACTORS AND INCOlVlE 
INEQUALITY FROM 1953 TO 1970 IN TAJWAN. 
Indicators of Income Inequality 1953 1961 1966 
Gini coefficient .58 .42 .32 
Income shared by the 
highest quintile (%) 61.4 52.0 41.5 
Special Social Factors 
Export as percentage of 
GNP 8.6 11.2 17.0 
Savings as percentage of 
GNP 8.9 12.8 21.5 
Unemployment (%) 4.4 4.3 3.1 









be interested only in short-term savings deposits. Even if the yearly interest rate for one-
year time deposits was 20 percent, and the interest rate was seven percent per month, the 
interest rate was still below the inflation rate in the early 1950s. In the second half of the 
1950s inflation was controlled, but the interest rate was too low to attract substantial 
amounts of long-term deposits. For example, the interest rate for deposits of three 
months' duration was 0.85 percent in 1957. The result was that a cumulating savings was 
hard in the 1950s, especially in the early 1950s, and the contribution of savings to 
domestic investment was minor. In sum, savings as percentage of GNP only increased 
slightly from 8.9 percent in 1953 to 12.8 percent in 1961. 
In the 1950s, government policy and foreign aid both concentrated on the 
agricultural sector and import substitution industries. In the early 1950s the percent of the 
labor force in agriculture was more than 55 percent The agricultural population was 4.3 
million in 1952. The growing agricultural population made unemployment decline from 
more than 6.5 percent in the late of 1940s to 4.4 percent by 1953. In the rest of the 
1950s, unemployment was around 4 percent. 
In the 19(i()s, the policy of export promotion and the establishment of export 
processing zones in 1966 made exports increase rapidly. Myers (Lau, 1990:30) argued 
that during the 1960s and 1970s the demand for manufactured goods in Japan and the 
West rapidly expanded and for every one percent rise in per capita income in Japan and 
the West, there was an even larger percentage increase in demand for Taiwan's 
manufactured goods. Many Taiwanese goods were inexpensive and their quality was 
improving. Exports as percentage of GNP increased dramatically from 11.2 percent in 
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1961 to 26.2 percent in 1970. Savings as a proportion of GNP skyrocketed from 12. 8 
percent in 1961to21.5 percent in 1966 to 25.5 percent in 1970. Almost half the 
investment before 1962 was financed by US aid and almost no private foreign capital 
flowed into Taiwan before 1961. The situation changed dramatically in the 1960s. The 
increased domestic savings were augmented by Taiwan's successful economic 
development, stimulation and management of foreign investment, and other social factors. 
For example, there was the popularity of opening small businesses, a cultural emphasis on 
family advancement, the very low social-security safety net, limited consumer credit, the 
widespread use of bonus payments, policy incentives regarding tax and interest rates, and 
a loosening of controls over loans to private business (Myers, 1984; Chan and Clark, 
1992). There was a rapid expansion oflabor-intensive light manufacturing, particularly in 
food processing, textiles, and electrical machinery industries. The expansion attracted the 
surplus of labor force in the 1960s. Unemployment declined rapidly from 4.3 percent in 
1961to1.7 percent in 1970. 
The period of the 1950s and 19()()s was the crucial time for improvement in 
income inequality. Comparing the changes in income inequality and changes in these 
special social factors, in the 1950s the relationship was only slight. But when these social 
factors were associated with economic growth in the second decade, the relationship 
became strong. Figure 3.7 displays changes in standardized variables during the 1950s 
and 19()()s. In the 1950s, the Gini coefficient and income shared by the highest quintile 
declined significantly. from around two standard deviations to less than one standard 
deviation. On the other hand, unemployment declined significantly but increased a little at 
FIGURE 3.7 CHANGES IN STANDARDIZED VARIABLES: 
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the end of the decade. Both exports as a percentage of GNP and savings as a percentage 
of GNP only increased slightly. In the 1960s, both the Gini coefficient and income shared 
by the highest quintile declined significantly from around 1.5 standard deviations to around 
negative 1 standard deviation. On the other hand, unemployment increased a little in the 
beginning of the 1960s but declined significantly in the rest of the decade. Both exports as 
a percentage of GNP and savings as a percentage of GNP increased significantly from 
around .5 negative standard deviation to around 2 standard deviations. In sum, the data 
support the argument that in the 1950s the relation was only slight, but in the 1960s the 
relation was strong. 
Table 3.11 displays changes in these factors and income inequality from 1970 to 
1988. First, exports as percentage of GNP grew at almost the same speed as last decade. 
They increased from 26.2 percent to 50.5 percent in the 1988. In these two decades the 
value of exports in U. S. dollars increased by 24 percent annually and real exports 
increased by 15 percent annually. These increases were the result of the export-promotion 
policy, which consisted of preferential tax treatment and credit subsidies, rebates of 
customs duties for re-exported intermediate goods and raw materials, and maintenance of 
an appropriate exchange rate (Lau, 1990). Secondly, savings as a percentage of GNP also 
grew significantly from 25.5 percent in 1970 to 34.9 percent in 1988. Especially in the 
1970s, it grew faster than in the 1980s. With the rapid increase in real GNP per capita in 
these two decades, savings rose as well. Rapid economic growth generated more savings 
and more firms were able to reinvest earnings and supplement their financial requirements 
by short-term borrowing from the banks or private moneylenders. The personal savings 
TABLE 3.11 CHANGES IN SPECIAL SOCIAL FACTORS A.l'ID INCOME 
INEQUALITY FROM 1970 TO 1988 IN TAIWAN. 
Indicators of Income Inequality 1970 1976 1980 
Gini coefficient .29 .28 .28 
Income shared by the 
highest quintile (%) 38.7 37.3 36.8 
Special Social Factors 
Export as percentage of 
GNP 26.2 44.1 47.8 
Savings as percentage of 
GNP 25.5 32.5 33.0 
llnemployment(%) 1.7 1.8 1.3 
*1987 data 









rate reached more than 30 percent of disposable income during this period, which 
increased from 3 percent in 1952 and 21 percent in 1980. In addition the non-bank 
financial sector grew extremely rapidly, partly because of the rapid growth in domestic 
savings. As a result, some financial crises occurred in late 1980s and early 1990s. Also 
there was a savings-investment gap in the late 1980s. In the 1980s, traditional industries 
were no longer attractive candidates for new investment and many entrepreneurs were 
reluctant to venture into new and unfamiliar industries because of real and perceived risk. 
They were faced with the uncertain exchange rate and political uncertainties created by the 
illness and death of the President Chiang Ching-kuo. Environmental and labor disputes 
further contributed to the uncertain business climate. The result was that domestic 
investment remained stagnant and gross national savings far exceeded gross domestic 
investment Thirdly, in these two decades, unemployment fluctuated around 1.6 percent. 
In this period unemployment was low and stable, except in the early 1980s. The rise in 
unemployment in the early 1980s was because of the effects of the second oil shock and 
relative depression in the same period. Yet unemployment was low in most of these two 
decades because of the expansion of the labor-intense manufacturing after the 1960s and 
the proliferation of small and medium-size manufacturing firms and services 
establishments. 
In sum, in the 1970s and 1980s, the further increases in savings and exports was 
not associated with further improvement in income inequality. The fluctuation of 
unemployment also did not show any obvious relation with income inequality. Figure 3.8 
displays changes in these social factors and in income inequality during the whole study 
FIGURE 3.8 CHANGES IN STANDARDIZED VARIABLES: 75 
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period. After 1970, both savings and exports as a percentage of GNP first increased 
rapidly, declined a little, and then increased more slowly over the rest of the period. In the 
1970s and 1 1980s unemployment fluctuated under zero standard deviation, except in the 
early to mid 1980s. The data also show no obvious relation between these social factors 
and income inequality after 1970. There are some other interesting points displayed by the 
figure. After 1970, income inequality leveled off at a low level and at the same time 
unemployment fluctuated at low level. In the four decades the pattern of changes in 
unemployment was similar to that in income inequality. After the early 1960s both 
exports as percent of GNP and savings as percent of GNP fluctuated at high levels and 
only increased a little while at the same time income inequality leveled off at a low level 
and only increased a little at the end of the last decade. In other words, after the early 
1970s, all exports as percent of GNP, savings as percent of GNP, and income inequality 




The major purpose of this study was to examine the factors used in most 
crossnational studies to explain income inequality (based on theoretical arguments) to see 
how these factors fit Taiwan. Table 4.1 summarizes the findings in this study. Like other 
single case studies, the results drawn from this study can not be generalized to other cases. 
But some important findings still have to be emphasized and discussed further. 
First, while the inverted U-shape hypothesis is applicable to most developed 
nations and some developing countries (like Puerto Rico), evidence drawn from the 
experience of Taiwan is less than clear-cut. This is partly due to the lack of data for the 
1940s and because of the relatively imprecise data for the 1950s. Data for the 1950s came 
from two small sampling surveys and two other surveys that contained information only 
on farm family incomes. To decide whether changes in income inequality in Taiwan fit the 
inverted U-shape argument the period of the 1940s and the early 1950s is crucial. A 
sophisticated observer of Asian agricultural conditions made the following observations 
following a two-week trip through the west coast rural part of Taiwan in September 1949: 
Of all the farmyards I have seen in the Far East, Southeast Asia, 
and in the Middle East, that of the average Taiwanese tenant is among the 
worst, both in appearance and in equipment. Tenants' huts, so-called 
barnyards, equipment, and livestock, as well as their health point to nothing 
but poverty (Ladejinsky, 1977:98). 
TABLE 4.1 SUMMARY OF FINDINGS IN THE STUDY OF T AlW ANS 
EXPERIENCE. 
Relations to Income Inequality 
Variables 1953-1970 1971-1990 
GNP per capita and energy 
consumption per capita negative none 
Percent of labor force in agriculture positive none 
Sector dualism coefficient none none 
Political democracy none none 
Export dependence none none 
Foreign investment none none 
us aid positive 
Education negative none 
Population growth positive none 
Population under age 15 none none 
Savings and export growth negative none 
Unemployment positive none 
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Per capita production in Taiwan's agricultural sector did not surpass peak 1938 levels until 
after 1960 (Barrett and Whyte, 1982; Ho, 1966). That is, production reached a peak in 
1938 and declined radically until 1950. However, it rose rapidly throughout the 1950s 
and 1960s. These two statements indicate that changes in income were radical in the 
1940s and the early 1950s, especially in the agricultural sector. 
Secondly, it is obvious that economic development had an effect on income 
inequality in Taiwan, and that the level of development was crucial. In the 11950s and 1 
1960s, the relationships between economic development and income inequality were 
significant, especially in the 1960s, but in the next two decades economic development did 
not improve income inequality further. According to World Development Report (1985), 
in the early 1980s Taiwan's income equality was in the top tenth among the measured 86 
countries. It was only less equality than some East European communist countries. It 
was hard to improve income inequality further. Another important finding drawn from 
sector dualism is that, unlike the theoretical argument that economic development 
increases the gap between the productivity of the labor force in the agricultural sector and 
that in other modem sectors, the productivity of the labor force in agriculture increased as 
well as that of other sectors. From 1950 to 1964 the labor force in agriculture increased 
33 percent, and at the same time the real net domestic product (NDP) from agriculture 
increased by about 80 percent (Kuo et al., 1979:47). From 1953 to 1968 labor 
productivity in agriculture increased 3.6 percent per year, and labor productivity in the 
industrial and services sectors increased 7 .5 percent per year and 4.1 percent per year, 
respectively (Kuo et al., 1981: 18). In the next decade labor productivity in these three 
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sectors increased almost at a same rate (around 4.3 percent per year). Also in the 1950s 
the improvement of income in the agricultural sector was the most important contributor 
to changes in income inequality in Taiwan. In the 1950s, both government policy and 
foreign aid concentrated on the recovery and development of agriculture. A series of land 
reform policies, the commitment of around 40 percent of U. S. aid spent on agricultural 
programs, promotion exports of agricultural products, and price manipulation of 
agricultural products all contributed to improve income in the agricultural sector. By 
increasing productivity and income in the agricultural sector while at the same time 
fostering growth in other sectors, Taiwan did not create the income disparity found in 
most situations and predicted by most theories of development. In the 1960s, however, 
the major contribution to the improvement of income inequality was ascribed to the 
expansion of labor-intense manufacturing. The growth of the agricultural sector during 
the 1950s used up the arable land. The 1960s' labor-intense manufacturing attracted the 
rural surplus labor force into this sector. This had two results. One was that the economy 
kept growing, even growing at a faster speed. The other was that due to the reduction of 
the labor force in agriculture, the productivity of that labor force kept increasing, even at 
the same rate as in other modem sectors. These two made income inequality improve 
further. 
Thirdly, it is obvious that democratization did not have a significant effect on 
income inequality in Taiwan during the study period. But the important thing drawn from 
the study is that the stable political environment and the endeavor of the government to 
keep society stable was crucial to both economic development and improvement in income 
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inequality. During the study period the KMT government implemented a series of policies 
to meet the goal of stability. For example, it released control of local government, 
allowed the election of local and provincial assemblies, expanded the 
central political elites to include the Taiwanese, maintained free and competitive markets 
and led people to concentrate on economic activities, allowed people to form nonpolitical 
organizations and periodicals. But the significant changes in political environment in the 
1970s and 1980s did not improve income inequality. 
Fourthly, foreign capital and export dependence did not retard economic 
development or worsen income inequality in Taiwan. According to dependency theory a 
peripheral position and dependence on core countries will retard economic growth. In 
some Latin American countries growth was retarded by an estimated 3 to 4 percent per 
year. But Taiwan's economy grew at 9 percent per year and income inequality improved 
at the same time. Taiwan depended heavily on exports to the US and Japan, but the 
changes in the export dependence were not significant over the most study period. Thus, 
the relation between the export dependence and income inequality was not clear. The 
influence of foreign capital in Taiwan did not contradict the argument of world-
system/dependence theorists. In the 1 950s a huge amount of foreign aid was granted, and 
it did not involve holding stocks in Taiwan. After the 19()()s foreign investment increased 
rapidly, but still only contributed less than 10 percent of the total domestic capital 
formation each year and was especially concentrated in some export zones. The situation 
in Taiwan is not like other developing countries that have high penetration of foreign 
capital. 
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Fifthly, the expansion of education had a negative relation with income inequality. 
According to Taiwan's experience, the most important thing was the spread of primary 
school education and junior high school education. However, in the last three decades, 
Taiwan's secondary education concentrated on occupational training. These "vocational 
schools" allowed many people to enter the labor force and also improved the income of 
the laborers. In the late 1 980s, the establishment of new colleges was allowed, and in the 
early 1990s, the government allowed some "vocational" institutions to upgrade to 
colleges. These two policies have made college enrollment expand rapidly, but this 
expansion had no effect on the improvement of income inequality so far. 
Sixthly, the theoretically-predicted relation between population growth and 
between population structure and income inequality was not totally supported in Taiwan's 
experience. There were two reasons. One was the success in agricultural reformation and 
the enhancement of productivity of the labor force in agriculture. The other was the 
expansion of labor intensive manufacturing. The population increased rapidly creating a 
surplus of labor force and a high dependency population which first went into agriculture 
in the 1950s and later went into manufacturing in the 1960s and thereafter. 
Seventhly, the export-led growth and export expansion and savings expansion had 
an important influence on economic development. Like the relation between economic 
development and income inequality, the relation between the expansion of exports and 
savings and income inequality was stronger in 1960s than in 1950s. 
Eighthly, only unemployment had almost the same change pattern as income 
inequality. Except in the early 19f>Os, unemployment declined significantly in the 1950s 
83 
and 1960s and after 1970 it fluctuated at a low level (1.7 percent). Unemployment had a 
positive relation with income inequality and after 1970 the low unemployment rate helped 
to maintain the income inequality at a low level in the 11970s and 1 1980s. On the other 
hand female employment did not have a significant relation with income inequality. 
According to available data, in 1962 the percent of female employment was 27.45 and it 
only increased slightly to 30.51 percent in 1970. After 1970, it still increased slowly 
around 3 percent each decade. In 1991, it was 37.5 percent. 
Finally, in the late 1980s and early 1990s income inequality worsened slightly. It 
still was at the lowest level (Gini .31) among countries in the world. However, due to 
radical changes in economic structure, the political environment, and other social 
indicators--for example, the rising proportion of female-headed households, and families 
with one or no child--income inequality is predicted to increase further in the near future. 
The pattern may parallel the recent experiences of some developed countries. For 
example, in the U. S. income inequality declined during 1930s to 1950s, and for the next 
two decades was characterized by a "curious stability," but the last two decades have been 
characterized by a resurgence of income inequality in American society. This has been 
enough to be called the "great U-turn" by Harrison and Bluestone (1988). A similar 
upswing in inequality has been documented in Canada, Sweden, Australia, and West 
Germany (Green et al., 1992). 
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Unstandardized Data 
Incorm: shared Gini Population Agriculture 0 ooflabor Natural incre3Sle °'o of population 
by the highest coefficient with Sc:Condary as ~o of NOP force in rate of und~age l.S 
quintile c:ducation agriculture population 
Year % % (per 1000) 
19.Sl 38.4 42.1 
19.S2 10.2 36 . 56. 36.7 42.6 
1953 61.4 . .S76 10.4 38.3 55.-J 3.S.8 
1954 10.9 31.7 54.8 36.4 
1955 11.3 32.9 .54 36.7 
1956 11.3 31.6 53.l 36.8 43.9 
1957 12 . .S 31.8 52.2 32.9 
1958 13. 31.l 51.3 34. 
1959 .44 13.5 30 . .S 50.8 34. 
1960 14.3 32.9 50. 32.6 
1961 52 .42 14.9 31.6 49.2 31.6 45.9 
1962 15.7 29.4 48.9 31. 4.S.9 
1963 16.7 26.8 48. 30.2 45.8 
1964 41.1 .32 17.6 28.3 47.1 28.8 4.S . .S 
1965 17.5 27.4 46.l 27.2 44.9 
1966 4U . 32 18.3 26.3 44.2 26.9 44 . 
1967 21.1 23.9 42. 23. 43.3 
1968 41.4 . 33 22.1 22.1 40 . 23.8 42.5 
1969 28. 18.9 38. 22.9 40 . .S 
1970 38. .29 30.2 18. 35.8 22.3 39.7 
1971 .29 31.6 14.9 34.8 20.8 38.7 
1972 38.6 .29 32.9 14.2 33.6 19.4 37.9 
1973 .30 32.2 14. l 32.3 19. 37.l 
1974 38.6 .29 33.9 14.5 31.3 18.7 36.2 
1975 .28 35.4 14.9 30. 18.3 35.3 
1976 37.3 .28 37.5 13.4 28. 21.2 34.7 
19'n .28 39.1 12.5 2.S.9 19. 33.9 
1978 37.2 . 29 41. 11.3 24 . 19.4 33.3 
1979 37.5 .29 42.6 10.4 22.1 19.7 32.7 
1980 36.8 . 28 44. 9.2 20 . 18.6 32.1 
1981 37 .28 45.8 8.7 18.1 31.6 
1982 37.3 .28 47.2 9.2 17.3 31.2 
1983 37.6 .29 48.4 8.8 15.7 30.8 
1984 37.4 .29 49.6 7.6 14.8 30.2 
1985 37.6 .29 50.8 6.9 13.2 29.6 
1986 38.2 .30 52. 6.5 11. 29; 
1987 38 .30 53.1 6.3 11.1 28.4 
1988 .30 54.3 6.1 12.7 12.1 27.9 
1989 .30 10.6 27.5 
1990 .31 11.4 27.l 
1991 .31 10.5 26.3 
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Energy GNP per Foreign % of export US aid Unemployment Savings as Export as 
consumption capita investment to US and as%of %ofGNP ~-oofGNP 
(liter oil (at 1981 as%of Japan GDCF 
equivalent NTS GDCF 
per pen;on) price) 
Year 
1951 
1952 17155 .5 56. l 45.5 4.6 9.8 8.5 
1953 18160 1.6 49.8 41. 4.4 8.9 8.6 
1954 19214 .9 56.2 37.9 4.2 7.7 5.8 
1955 20014 1.8 63.9 53.8 4. 9. 6.4 
1956 20377 1.6 42.8 29.2 3.8 9.2 8.5 
1957 21188 .6 38.7 22.8 3.9 10.6 9.2 
1958 21870 .8 48.l 37.3 4. 9.9 8.6 
1959 22812 .4 50.1 36.2 4. 10.3 11. 
1960 23524 4.5 49.2 31.8 4.1 12.7 9.5 
1961 24356 4.1 50.9 33.8 4.3 12.8 11.2 
1962 379.2 25508 u 48.3 20.2 4.3 12.4 11.3 
1963 383. 27089 4.5 48. 20.5 4.5 17.l 15.2 
1964 421.9 29549 4.2 49.5 9.7 4.5 19.6 17. 
1965 453.2 31892 6.5 51.9 10.l 3.4 19.6 16 
1966 499. 33826 4.4 45.4 5.8 3.1 21.5 17 
1967 534.4 36495 6.4 44.l 2.6 2.3 22.5 17.6 
1968 604.9 38887 8.4 51.5 .6 1.8 22.1 18.6 
1969 643.9 41460 9.1 53. - 1.9 23.8 21.4 
1970 689.2 45198 9.6 52.7 1.7 25.5 26.2 
1971 751.3 50050 9.4 53.6 1.7 28.8 31.3 
1972 852.8 '5708 6.3 54.5 u 32.1 37.8 
1973 936.3 61668 7.9 55.8 1.3 34.6 41.6 
1974 925. 61262 3.3 51.1 l.S 31.7 38.9 
197S 1007.5 62797 2.5 47.4 2.5 26.9 34.4 
1976 1180.4 69964 2.5 50.6 1.8 32.5 44.l 
1977 1256.9 75604 2.7 50.8 1.8 32.9 43.l 
1978 1456.3 84610 2.8 51.9 1.7 34.9 47.4 
1979 1550. 90005 3. 49.1 1.3 34.5 48.4 
1980 1620.1 94580 3.3 45.1 1.3 33. 47.8 
1981 1526.5 98179 2.7 47. 1.4 32. 47. 
1982 1528.1 99687 3.2 50.1 2.2 30.4 45.8 
1983 1666.7 105893 3.5 55. 2.8 32.1 48.5 
1984 17S3. 115356 4.6 59.3 2.5 33.7 52.1 
1985 1800.4 119606 6.6 59.4 3. 33.5 50.2 
1986 1944.1 132019 6.5 59.1 2.7 37.8 53.5 
1987 2072.8 146111 7.4 57.l 2. 38.5 53.9 
1988 2270.1 155168 4.2 53.2 1.7 34.9 50.5 
1989 2396.5 1.6 
1990 2507.l 1.7 




1. Quintile income distribution and Gini coefficients refer to the following: 
a. Gini coefficients of the years of 1952 and 1959 refer to Shirley W. Y. Kuo, "Income 
distribution by size in Taiwan area--changes and causes, 11 in Income Distribution. 
Employment and Economic Development in Southeast and East Asia 2 Vols, 
Tokyo: Japan Economic Research Center, 1975. 
b. The quintile income distribution in the years of 1953, 1961, and 1964, and the Gini 
coefficient of the year of 1964 refer to Steve Chan and Cal Clar~ 1992 Flexibility, 
Foresight, and Fortuna in Iaiwn's Development, p. 163, New York: 
Routledge. 
c. Quintile income distribution and Gini coefficients, 1966-87, refer to Council for 
Economic Planning and Development ( 1989). Taiwan Statistical Data 
Bilak, 1989. Taipei: Council for Economic Planning and Development. 
d. The Gini coefficients of the years 1971, 1973, 1975,1977, 1989-91 refer to 
"National Income in Taiwan Area, R 0 C 11 , and "Report on the Smyey of 
Personal Income Distribution in Taiwan Area, R 0 C , 11 by Directorate 
General of Budget, Accounting and Statistics, Executive Yuan. 
e. The Gini coefficient of the year of 1961 is calculated by this study based on 
quintile income distribution. The formula is accorded to DGBAS's formula as the 
following. 
Gini = l/n times sum of (Yj - Yi), where Yj is larger than or equal to Yi 
Yj = Yi I sum of Yi, and Yi is the disposable income of the ith household. 
2. Percent of population with secondary education refers to Council for 
Economic Planning and Development ( 1989). The year 1969 and after is affected 
by including military personnel in population statistics. Taiwan Statistical Data Book, 
1989. Taipei: Council for Economic Planning and Development. 
3. Agriculture as percentage of net domestic product (NDP) refers to Council for 
Economic Planning and Development ( 1989). Taiwan Statistical Data Book, 1989. 
Taipei: Council for Economic Planning and Development. 
4. Agriculture as percentage of gross domestic product (GDP) refers to National 
Income in Taiwan Area R 0 C, by Directorate-General of Budget, Accounting 
and Statistics, Executive Yuan, and Social Indicators in Taiwan Area of the Republic 
of China 1991, Taipei: Directorate-General of Budget, Accounting and Statistics. 
5. Percent oflabor force in agriculture 1952-1980 refers to Council for 
Economic Planning and Development, Executive Yuan, Republic of China, 
Directorate-General of budget, Accounting and Statistics, Taiwan Statistical Data 
llilQk 1983. The year of 1988 is calculated from the Survey Report of Labor Force, 
Directorate-General of Budget, Accounting and Statistics (DGBAS, 1988). 
6. Natural increase rate of population refers to Taiwan Population Studies Center 
Demographic Reference: Taiwan, Republic of China, 1965, Vols. 1 and 2; 
Directorate-General of Budget, Accounting and Statistics, Statistical Abstract 
of the Republic of China, various issues. The years of 1962 to 1991 refer to 
Taiwan-Fukien Demographic Fact Book, R 0 C , by the Ministry of the Interior. 
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The natural increase rate of population is equal to (birth-deatb)/estimate for midyear 
population. 
7. Percent of the population under age 15 refers to Taiwan-Fukien Demographic 
Fact Book, R 0 C , by the Ministry of the Interior, and Social Indicators in Taiwan 
Area of the Republic of China, 1991.Taipei: Directorate-General of Budget, 
Accounting, and Statistics. 
8. Energy consumption per capita (liter oil equivalent per person) refers to 
Monthly Statistics of Energy, Energy Indictors Quarterly Taiwan Area R 0 C , 
and Taiwan Energy Statistics, all by Energy Commission, Ministry of Economic 
Affairs. 
9. GNP per capita (at 1981 NT$ price) refers to Council for Economic Planning and 
Development (1989). Taiwan Statistical Data Book, 1989. Taipei Council for 
Economic Planning and Development. 
10. Indices of political and civil rights refer to Gastil, R. D. various years. "The 
comparative survey of freedom." Freedom at Issue (Jan./Feb.). Indices of political 
and civil rights, in scales on which 1 represents full freedom and 7 maximum 
authoritarian controls. 
Explanation: 
a. The political rights index is coded annually by Raymond D. Gastil and published 
by Freedom House. Political rights involve the right to play a part in determining 
who will govern one's countries and what the laws will be. Countries are coded 
with scores ranging from 1 (highest degree of liberty) to 7 (lowest degree of 
liberty), as follows: 
1) Political systems in which the great majority of persons of families has both the 
right and the opportunity to participate in the electoral process. Political parties 
may be freely formed for the purpose of making the right to compete for public 
office fairly general. 
2) Political systems with an open process, which does not always work well, 
however, due to extreme poverty, a feudal social structure, violence, or other 
limitations on potential participants or results. As is the case with countries 
code 1, a leader or party can be voted out of office. 
3) Political system in which people may elect their leaders or representatives, but 
in which coups d'etat, large-scale interference with election results, and often 
nondemocratic procedures occur. 
4) Political systems in which full democratic elections are blocked constitutionally 
or have little significance in determining power distributions. 
5) Political systems in which elections are either closely controlled or limited, or in 
which the results have little significance. 
6) Political systems without elections or with elections involving only a single lis~8 
of candidates in which voting is largely a matter of demonstrating support for 
the system. Nevertheless, there is some distribution of political power. 
7) Political systems that are tyrannies without legitimacy either in tradition or in 
international party doctrine. 
b. The civil rights index is coded annually by Raymond D. Gastil and published by 
Freed om House. Civil rights are those rights the individual has vis a vis the state. 
Particularly important are the freedom of the press and the other media and the 
independence of the judiciary. Countries are coded with scores ranging from 1 
(greatest civil liberty) to 7 (least civil liberty), as follows: 
1) Political systems in which the rule oflaw is unshaken. Freedom of expression is 
both possible and evident in a variety of news media. 
2) Political systems that aspire to the above level of civil rights but are unable to 
achieve it because of violence, ignorance, or unavailability of the media, or 
because they have restrictive laws that seem to be greater than are needed 
for maintaining order. 
3) Political systems that have the trappings of civil liberty and whose governments 
may be successfully opposed in the courts, although they may be threatened or 
have unresolvable political deadlocks and may have to rely often upon martial 
law, jailing for sedition, and suppression of publications. 
4) Political systems in which there are broad areas of freedom but also broad areas 
of illegality. States recently emerging from a revolutionary situation or in 
transition from traditional society may easily fall into this category. 
5) Political systems in which civil rights are often denied but in which there is no 
doctrine on which the denial is based. The media are often weak, controlled by 
the government, and censored. 
6) Political systems in which no civil rights are thought to take priority over the 
rights of the state, although criticism is allowed to be stated in limited ways. 
7) Political systems of which the outside world never hears criticism, except when 
it is condemned by the state. Citizens have no rights in relation to the state. 
11. The number of newspapers and periodicals, the number of civic organizations, 
and the members of civic organizations refer to Taiwan Statistical Data Book, 
1989. Taipei: Council for Economic Planning and Development 1989. 
12. The percentage of candidates elected to the Provincial Assembly refers to 
Social Indicators in Taiwan Area of the Republic of China, 1988. Taipei: 
Directorate-General of Budget, Accounting, and Statistics (1989). 
13. KMT's share of the Provincial Assembly votes and seats refers to Lui, F. L. 
(1989) "Ballot power" Free China Review 39:12, 9-15. 
14. Political demonstrations, strikes, riots, deaths from political violence, 
government sanctions, and political executions refer to Taylor, C. L. and 
D. A. Jodice 1983. World Handbook of Political and Social Indicators, 
3rd edn. New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press. 
a. A government sanction is an action taken by the authorities to neutralize, 
suppress, or eliminate a perceived threat to the security of the government, the 
regime, or the state itself The sanction events include censorship of individual 
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or institutions, general restrictions on political activity, and other restrictions on 
social and political behavior. Censorship includes actions by authorities to limit, 
curb, or intimidate the mass media, including newspapers, magazines, books, 
radio, and television. Restrictions on political behavior include general restrictive 
measures by the authorities, such as the declaring of martial law, mobilizing 
troops for domestic security, and instituting a curfew. The example for 
restrictions on political behavior is that one or more foreigners are arrested or 
detained on charges of spying, sabotage, or unlawful interference in the domestic 
politics of the state, constituting a perceived threat to internal security. Reports of 
crackdowns against organized crime or drives by the police to reduce crime in the 
streets were not included. 
b. A political execution is an event in which a person or group is put to death under 
orders of the national authorities while in their custody. Typically, a political 
execution is one in which the person executed in charged with activities 
threatening the security of the state, the regime, the government, or the 
leadership. Excluded are assassinations and persons killed in riots, armed 
attacks, strikes, and the like. Also excluded are executions for criminal offenses, 
such as murder. 
15. Bollen's political democracy index refers to Bollen, Kenneth A. (1980) "Issues in the 
comparative measurement of political democracy" American Sociological Review 
Vol. 45:370-90. 
a. Six components consist of the index, press freedom, freedom of group 
opposition, government sanctions, fairness of elections, executive selection, and 
legislative selection. The range of the scale, from 0 to 100, is arbitrary. The 0 
point does not represent the lowest degree of political democracy possible, nor 
does 100 represent complete equality. Further reductions or increases in 
political democracy are possible for those countries at or near the end points. 
The countries which score near 100 still have political power concentrated in an 
elite, and generally the elite underrepresents females and minorities of the 
country. Limited though it may be, the nonelite in countries that score near the 
bottom of the index still have some political power. 
b. The index of Political democracy is designed to measure popular sovereignty (as 
represented in electoral processes) and political liberties. It does not consider 
political stability, voter turnout~ socialist party strength. or labor union strength in 
its construction. 
c. It must be remembered that these are observed scores and not true scores. Small 
different between countries on the index do not necessarily mean that actual level 
of political democracy differs. For example, in 1965 Sudan scores 37.9 and Togo 
scores 45.5. This does not mean that the true political democracy score of Togo 
is greater than Sudan. Due to measurement error, each true score gives rise to a 90 
number of different observed score. So it is possible that Sud en and Togo have 
the same true score even though their observed scores differ. Of course, the 
greater the distance between observed scores, the more likely two countries' true 
scores differ. 
d. The Gastil's index is a seven scale index. When it is translated into 100 scale index, 
each scale is equal to 14.29. In this study, the Bollen's index for Taiwan in 1965 is 
equal to 22.8. When the 22.8 is divided by 14.29, the result is equal to 1.60. Due 
to the directions of the Gastil's and Bollen's are different, the 1.60 is equal to 5.4 in 
the Gastil's index (7-1.60 = 5.4). 
16. Foreign investment, the percentage of export to U.S. and Japan, and net 
capital flows into Taiwan as a percentage of total investment refers to 
Taiwan Statistical Data Book, 1987 and 1989. Taipei: Council for Economic 
Planning and Development ( 1987 and 1989). 
17. Data of US aid refer to Chan and Clark 1992 Flexibility Foresight and Fortuna in 
Taiwan's Development p. 173. New York: Routledge. 
18. Employment and Unemployment: 
a. Unemployment, 1952-1988, refers to Council for Economic Planning and 
Development ( 1989). Taiwan Statistical Data Book, 1989. Taipei: Council 
for Economic Planning and Development. p. 13 for the number of people in 
the labor force and actually employed, and for 1989 to 1991 refers to 
Yearbook of manpower Statistics, Taiwan Area, R 0 C , by Directorate-
General of Budget, Accounting, and Statistics (DGBAS), Executive Yuan. 
b. Employment, female employment, and employment by industry , 1962-1991, 
refer to Social Indicators in Taiwan Area of the Republic of China, 1991, 
Taipei: Directorate-General of Budget, Accounting, and Statistics, and 
Yearbook ofManpower Survey Statistics, Taiwan Area, R 0 C." by 
Directorate-General of Budget, Accounting and Statistics, Executive Yuan. 
19. The savings as percentage of GNP refers to Council for Economic Planrtjng and 
Development (I 989). Taiwan Statistical Data Book, 1989. Taipei: Council for 
Economic Planning and Development. 
20. The export as percentage of GNP refers to Council for Economic Planning and 
Development (1989), Taiwan Statistical Data Book, 1989. Taipei: Council for 
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